In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Dec 2020: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Dec 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 5384 EMIRATES-INTERNET 2017-02-17 2020-12-04 51559 NETINTERNET 2017-05-30 2020-12-10 9121 TTNet 2017-07-14 2020-12-20 202365 Chronos 2019-07-10 2020-12-20 24835 RAYA 2020-08-04 2020-12-04 43242 extend 2020-12-21 2020-12-29 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Source Address Validation issues inferred during Dec 2020 using open resolver tests: ASN Name Last-Detected 15924 BORUSANTELEKOM 2020-12-05 199826 IQSTC-IQ 2020-12-05 50710 EarthLink 2020-12-05 201713 gaziantepdc 2020-12-05 202055 QematAlwasat 2020-12-05 57689 RASHED-ALRASHED 2020-12-05 51074 MABNA 2020-12-04 208570 spark-iq 2020-12-04 50057 Parvaz-System 2020-12-04 197882 Tarin 2020-12-03 Further information for these tests is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/ornog.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
