In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Jun 2022: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2022: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2022-06-30 5384 EMIRATES-INTERNET 2017-02-17 2022-06-19 58224 TCI 2018-10-22 2022-06-17 8376 2018-12-16 2022-06-03 49100 IR-THR-PTE 2022-05-09 2022-06-28 212369 TRDESERVER 2022-06-07 2022-06-30 206206 KNET 2022-06-07 2022-06-27 34636 Laser 2022-06-12 2022-06-22 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
