In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Jun 2024: ASN Name Fixed-By 216343 2024-06-16 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2024: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 25019 SAUDINETSTC 2016-07-06 2024-06-30 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2024-06-24 5384 EMIRATES-INTERNET 2017-02-17 2024-06-24 9121 TTNet 2017-07-14 2024-06-27 34984 TELLCOM 2018-11-20 2024-06-29 8966 Etisalat 2019-08-08 2024-06-24 51375 VIVABH 2023-03-06 2024-06-27 204203 Takallou 2024-01-10 2024-06-08 44620 COSMOIX 2024-05-27 2024-06-24 29262 IDEALHOSTING 2024-05-28 2024-06-25 203399 Extranet 2024-05-28 2024-06-24 12735 ASTurkNet 2024-06-03 2024-06-24 210538 2024-06-11 2024-06-25 209275 nimanet 2024-06-12 2024-06-24 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
