In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Dec 2024: ASN Name Fixed-By 200040 2024-12-09 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Dec 2024: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2024-12-27 36992 ETISALAT-MISR 2017-04-26 2024-12-22 9121 TTNet 2017-07-14 2024-12-12 9038 BAT-AS9038 2018-09-19 2024-12-23 34984 TELLCOM 2018-11-20 2024-12-31 51375 VIVABH 2023-03-06 2024-12-27 29262 IDEALHOSTING 2024-05-28 2024-12-25 203399 Extranet 2024-05-28 2024-12-26 209275 nimanet 2024-06-12 2024-12-27 205424 ulunet 2024-09-07 2024-12-15 205935 farknet 2024-10-31 2024-12-26 215419 2024-11-20 2024-12-04 396982 GOOGLE-PRIVATE-CLOUD 2024-12-06 2024-12-06 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
