In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Nov 2025: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Nov 2025: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 25019 SAUDINETSTC 2016-07-06 2025-11-28 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2025-11-29 5384 EMIRATES-INTERNET 2017-02-17 2025-11-22 9121 TTNet 2017-07-14 2025-11-24 8376 2018-12-16 2025-11-29 8966 Etisalat 2019-08-08 2025-11-22 51375 VIVABH 2023-03-06 2025-11-24 204203 Hamid-Bagheri 2023-11-02 2025-11-30 29262 IDEALHOSTING 2024-05-28 2025-11-27 12735 ASTurkNet 2024-06-03 2025-11-18 47331 TTNET 2025-06-21 2025-11-30 206716 Tawasul_Hybrid 2025-07-17 2025-11-24 57511 ITEL-AS-NUMBER 2025-11-24 2025-11-25 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
