In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during May 2026: ASN Name Fixed-By 211804 SISTEMDC 2026-05-21 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during May 2026: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2026-05-30 9121 TTNet 2017-07-14 2026-05-27 8376 2018-12-16 2026-05-30 51375 VIVABH 2023-03-06 2026-05-26 29262 IDEALHOSTING 2024-05-28 2026-05-05 15924 BORUSANTELEKOM 2025-06-13 2026-05-16 47331 TTNET 2025-06-21 2026-05-05 206716 Tawasul_Hybrid 2025-07-17 2026-05-30 205196 BIGCORE-ASN 2026-04-04 2026-05-28 58232 Melbourne-Dodo-Avid 2026-04-04 2026-05-04 213887 2026-04-16 2026-05-14 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
