Oh, they quickly agreed to a cease fire - everybody agreed and signed. We
came on home; coupla years later, after Congress "told" em they could do
whatever they wanted with S. Vietnam without any interference from us
(refused any more aid to S. Vietnam), they took it all, anyway. I. e.,
Congress gave it all away.
Wilton
----- Original Message -----
From: "archer75--- via Mercedes" <[email protected]>
To: "Mercedes Discussion List" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2016 7:16 AM
Subject: [MBZ] Why the U.S. "lost" the Vietnam War?
Wilton once wrote that after massive U.S. bombing of Hanoi, during which he
took part, he couldn't understand why the U.S. did not invade North Vietnam
or make peace on U.S. terms since Hanoi would have agreed to a cease fire.
Would the following likely be the reason?
Book is available at:
http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?an=schaller&sts=t&tn=altered+states
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Altered States by Michael Schaller.
Japan's economic ascendancy
in the 1960s (which happened in large part because it was a supplier to
America's
Vietnam War effort) made President Richard Nixon interested in
establishing ties
to China as a counterbalance to Japan. China's border wars with the
Soviet Union
in 1969 created an opening for the U.S. to make overtures to China. And
warmer relations
with China would make it easier to exit the Vietnam War. In the greatest
of ironies,
at the same time China began to fear the repercussions of an American loss
in Vietnam.
The rapprochement came in a cloud of intrigue:
"[In 1971], Nixon delivered twin shocks -- his July 15 announcement of a
planned
visit to China followed by his August 15 decision to cut the dollar
loose from
gold, impose an import surcharge, and force the upward valuation of the
yen. He
also threatened to impose textile quotas [on Japan] under the terms of
the Trading
with the Enemy Act....
"Nixon's and Kissinger's interest in opening a dialogue with China
reflected deeper
changes in the cold war. On taking office, both men recognized that the
Soviet
Union had or would soon achieve a rough nuclear parity with the United
States. Instead
of a costly and probably futile effort to restore superiority, they sought
to moderate
Soviet behavior through economic and political incentives broadly labeled
'détente.'
These included negotiated limits on strategic weapons, increased trade and
technology
transfer, and recognition that the Soviet Union had legitimate global
interests.
...
"In March 1969, the protracted war of words between Moscow and Beijing
escalated
into a series of border skirmishes. This schism created an opportunity
for the
United States to play off the Communist rivals against each other,
assuming Washington
had some leverage with the People's Republic of China. Following the
border clashes,
Nixon and Kissinger concluded that improved ties with China might
constrain Soviet
behavior and impel both rivals to cooperate with the United States or risk
isolation.
...
"The leverage gained through triangular diplomacy with Moscow and Beijing
might
also hasten an end to the Vietnam War (through Soviet or Chinese pressure
on North
Vietnam), provide Washington with greater influence over Japan, and
facilitate
an orderly reduction of U.S. military power in Asia.
"Just as fear of Chinese expansion initially prompted American
intervention in
Vietnam, a desire to assist Chinese resistance to Soviet pressure
increased the
administration's determination to speed a settlement in Vietnam. In
effect, Nixon
began to apply his 'doctrine' of reduced involvement in Asia before,
rather than
after, 'victory' in Vietnam. As Kissinger elaborated, the 'China
initiative ...
restored perspective to our national policy.' It reduced 'Indochina to its
proper
scale -- a small peninsula on a major continent.' The 'drama' of opening
ties with
China would 'ease for the American people the pain that would inevitably
accompany
our withdrawal from Southeast Asia.'
"In an odd symmetry, ... Chinese leaders feared an assault by their former
ally.
Japan's growing wealth and assertiveness -- brought home by Sato's
affirmation
in 1969 of an interest in the security of South Korea, Taiwan, and
Vietnam -- raised
the added specter of a rearmed, expansive Japan. ...
"Because the retreat of American power [in the withdrawal of troops from
Vietnam]
coincided with a growing Soviet threat, Chinese strategists who previously
feared
a U.S. victory in Vietnam now agonized about the consequences of a
defeat. America's
retreat would leave China caught between the Soviet Union and Japan. As
Nixon and
Kissinger hoped, Mao's determination to protect China outweighed his
disdain for
capitalism, solidarity with Hanoi, mistrust of the United States, and
drive to regain
Taiwan.
"During 1969 and 1970, the administration signaled a desire to improve
ties with
China. ... On June 2, 1971, after almost two years of secret exchanges,
Zhou Enlai
invited Kissinger to come to China to arrange a presidential visit.
Kissinger described
the message as 'the most important communication that has come to an
American president
since the end of World War II.' ...
"Nixon the politician saw as much advantage in the China initiative as did
Nixon
the statesman. To make certain he received maximum credit for the
breakthrough,
the president prodded his staff to keep Kissinger under wraps and away
from journalists
when he returned from Beijing. Nixon not only kept news of the approach to
China
secret from the Department of State and America's allies before his
public announcement
on July 15, but wanted steps taken to ensure that no prominent
Americans -- and
certainly no Democratic politicians, such as Senator Edward Kennedy --
traveled
to China before he did. He spoke of his pending trip as something 'good to
hit the
Democrats with at primary time.' The NATO allies and Japan would be told
of the
initiative by telephone, just before the president went public."
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