as an update with my personal schedule, it looks like windows are either a week in August or a week in September to actually deploy this study for a small pilot with my university collaborator! so might be good to get this locked down in the next month...
On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 11:06 PM, Tom Ritter <[email protected]> wrote: > On 7 July 2014 04:17, Joseph Bonneau <[email protected]> wrote: > > So am I correct in reading that your main concern is that an attacker > able > > to do 2^80 work can't always find an 80-bit match (by which we mean any > > desirable type of match that has a probability of 2^-80 of occurring by > > chance)? > > No, it's around what _type_ of match we generate for an attacker's > fingerprint. Do we flip bits at random, or do we optimize for the > encoded fingerprint type. The latter introduces a certain amount of > subjectiveness. (It's quite objective if we do a fuzzy match based on > phonetic differences, it's much-less-subjective-but-still-a-little-bit > if we do a 'leading and trailing n bits' match). > > I argued strongly for full subjectivity, then went to random bit > flips, and now I'm back to saying let's do something in-between. > > -tom > _______________________________________________ > Messaging mailing list > [email protected] > https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging >
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