On Sep 9, 2014, at 1:09 PM, Tony Arcieri <[email protected]> wrote:
> If you have your key fingerprint published through many channels, someone 
> concerned with actually verifying your key fingerprint can check them all to 
> ensure they match. If there's a discrepancy, something is probably amiss.
> 
> Perhaps an attacker managed to compromise them all and update your key 
> fingerprints in all locations to confuse a victim into sending the attacker 
> an encrypted message. Sure, it's not a great solution. It's an OK solution, 
> however. Certainly better (from a security, not usability perspective) than 
> TOFU.

I think it's important to remind us who we're dealing with.

The fact that Keybase lookups are done over HTTPS eliminates most malicious 
actors.

If Keybase pins their cert (do they?), that virtually guarantees the validity 
of the github and twitter URLs.

The lookup would proceed to those services, to which the keys are not pinned, 
so the scope widens a bit again, just enough to include the Five Eyes, the host 
companies themselves (twitter and github), and anyone who hacked them.

What are the capabilities of the Five Eyes?

I think many would agree they are capable of manipulating and/or censoring 
connections (HTTPS or not) in an automated fashion, but with some difficulty 
(and non-zero possibility of detection). That implies that most keys returned 
from Keybase would be accurate, but for a small fraction they might not be.

I'd summarize the quality of service Keybase provides like so:

- For 99% of cases, it does a great job.
- For maybe <1%, it could provide false answers.
- There is the possibility of DoS / censorship (given that it is a centralized 
service) for everyone.

> Short of things like Google's proposed CT-alike for E2E looking for dishonest 
> Key Directories, I'm not sure how you do better.

OpenBazaar has plans to do public key lookups for pseudonyms in Namecoin via 
DNSChain:

https://github.com/OpenBazaar/OpenBazaar/issues/487

That has the advantage of virtually guaranteeing correct responses, and the 
decentralized nature makes it mostly invulnerable to DoS and censorship.

- Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with 
the NSA.

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

_______________________________________________
Messaging mailing list
[email protected]
https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging

Reply via email to