Dear Ron, In the old days, before smartphones were a thing, encrypted chat sessions were largely established between two parties that were both online at the same time. This would allow Bob issue an OTPK to Alice on demand as you say.
However, X3DH’s designers created that protocol specifically because they needed to be able to initiate secure chat sessions in a manner that replicated the user experience of SMS. If, for example: 1. Bob turns off his phone. 2. Alice sends an initial SMS to Bob. 3. Alice turns off her phone. 4. Bob turns on his phone. …Bob would still receive the SMS at step 4. At the time when X3DH was created, the existing mainstream encrypted chat protocol, OTR, did not allow for this SMS user experience to be replicated because it necessitated that both parties have their devices online at the same time. Therefore, the essential inaccuracy in your description is that you believe that X3DH is a protocol meant "establish a session key for a real-time communications session.” It is more accurate that X3DH was designed in order to allow for communications sessions to be established both synchronously (“in real-time”) and asynchronously (if one of the parties is offline at the time of requested session establishment.) Regarding the possibility of draining OTPK and this causing a DOS attack, this has historically been dealt with in the following ways: 1. TextSecure V2 (an old version of what is now known as “X3DH” and “Signal Protocol”) used to have something called a “last-resort OTPK” which would be re-used indefinitely until Bob came back online and updated his OTPK bundle. 2. More recent specifications make OTPKs optional. If no OTPK is available, the Diffie-Hellman handshake is accomplished exclusively between Bob’s signed pre-key, Alice’s session ephemeral key, Alice’s long-term identity key, and Bob’s long-term identity key. If a OTPK is available, X3DH more or less becomes “X4DH” due to an extra handshake between Bob’s OTPK and Alice’s session ephemeral key. Nadim > On Feb 4, 2017, at 6:25 PM, Ron Garret <r...@flownet.com> wrote: > > The X3DH protocol calls for Bob to publish a set of one-time pre-keys (OTPKs) > to the server. What is the purpose of this? Why not just have Bob issue an > OTPK directly to Alice on demand as the first step in the protocol? > > The only possible answer I can think of is that Bob might not be on-line to > fulfill the request. But the whole point of X3DH (as I understand it) is to > establish a session key for a real-time communications session, so if Bob is > not on line the whole protocol is moot. > > AFAICT, having OTPKs on the server introduces additional complexity (the > protocol now has two cases depending on whether an OTPK is available) and > additional attacks (a DOS attack where an adversary drains the OTPK pool) > requiring mitigations (like rate limiting, i.e. more complexity) for no > apparent advantage. Have I missed something? > > rg > > _______________________________________________ > Messaging mailing list > Messaging@moderncrypto.org > https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list Messaging@moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
