Thanks for all the recommendations everyone!
On 27/01/2019 10.13, dawuud wrote: > > The recently published anonymity trilemma paper is fascinating, and > points out the tradeoff between bandwidth, latency and anonymity; note > the very interesting graph at the top of page 16, and that Loopix > holds an interesting position on this graph: > > Anonymity Trilemma: Strong Anonymity, Low > Bandwidth Overhead, Low Latency—Choose Two > by Debajyoti Das, Sebastian Meiser, Esfandiar Mohammadi, Aniket Kate > https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/954.pdf > > > The recent Loopix paper explores this tradeoff in the context of a > continuous time mix strategy called the Poisson mix: > > The Loopix Anonymity System > by Ania M. Piotrowska, Jamie Hayes, Tariq Elahi, Sebastian Meiser, George > Danezis > https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/publications/article-2830.pdf > > No need to cry about bandwidth usage if we are willing to sacrifice > the low latency and replace it with "medium latency". Instead of using > constant time padding or decoy traffic we can instead make use of a Poisson > process which samples from an exponential distribution. Loopix clients use a > FIFO queue for sending messages where items are removed from the queue and > sent > based on time intervals from the Poisson process. If queue is empty send > decoys. > > Unsure how well this will work on phones... (especially dubious if they go to > sleep) > Hopefully in the coming years we will see more research into these tradeoffs > and concrete tuning parameters for Loopix and other similar designs. :) > > Like Holger Krekel said, perhaps mixnets can help. This is our long term plan. > For short term solutions of course use Tor! (Tor is very obviously the best > currently deployed anonymous communication protocol) > > ♥λⒶ 😼 enjoy the reads > > Cheers, > David > > > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 02:05:32AM -0500, grarpamp wrote: >> DeepCorr: Strong Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor Using Deep Learning >> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.07285 >> >> Some assert that the only way to beat this >> class (general timing and traffic analysis) is >> with full time regulated fill traffic. >> Then people cry bandwidth... before realizing the >> selectability of the committed rate is pursuant >> to their needs, and being no more than they can >> get, or would use, over non-fill nets anyways. >> Or with a, unusable for low latency..., random store >> forward lossy additive mixes... being a non general >> and gappy form of fill anyway. >> >> Are there any papers covering potential schemes for >> managing traffic fill (negotiation of rates, dynamic >> yielding to take on wheat presented, hop by hop >> vs network wide awareness and control mechanisms, >> dropping nodes that fail to fill per negotiation, etc)? >> _______________________________________________ >> Messaging mailing list >> Messaging@moderncrypto.org >> https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging > > _______________________________________________ > Messaging mailing list > Messaging@moderncrypto.org > https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list Messaging@moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging