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• • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Nadim Kobeissi
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Vincent Breitmoser
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Wei Chuang
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Ian Miers
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Michael Grinich
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Wei Chuang
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Wei Chuang
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Wei Chuang
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Tankred Hase
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Wei Chuang
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email GDR!
  • Re: [messaging] Axolotl for email Микола
• [messaging] Fwd: Traffic shaping attack grarpamp
• [messaging] Upcoming design changes in Viol^W Flute! George Kadianakis
• [messaging] Partial order group chat with partial history visibility Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Partial order group chat with partial history visibility Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] Partial order group chat with partial history visibility Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Partial order group chat with partial history visibility Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Partial order group chat with partial history visibility Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] Partial order group chat with partial history visibility Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Partial order group chat with partial history visibility Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Signal Protocol Licensing/Intellectual Property Status Nadim Kobeissi
  • Re: [messaging] Signal Protocol Licensing/Intellectual Property Status Torsten Grote
  • Re: [messaging] Signal Protocol Licensing/Intellectual Property Status Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Viola: A simple secure multiparty messaging system George Kadianakis
  • Re: [messaging] Viola: A simple secure multiparty messaging system George Chatzisofroniou
  • Re: [messaging] Viola: A simple secure multiparty messaging system George Kadianakis
  • Re: [messaging] Viola: A simple secure multiparty messaging system carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Viber's New End-to-End Authentication Michael Farb
  • Re: [messaging] Viber's New End-to-End Authentication Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Viber's New End-to-End Authentication Frederic Jacobs
  • Re: [messaging] Viber's New End-to-End Authentication Michael Farb
  • Re: [messaging] Viber's New End-to-End Authentication Ben Laurie
  • Re: [messaging] Viber's New End-to-End Authentication Wasa Bee
• [messaging] Pijul for messaging based collaboration tools Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] WaveCrypt Mihai Ionut
  • Re: [messaging] WaveCrypt Justin King-Lacroix
  • Re: [messaging] WaveCrypt Joseph Gentle
  • [messaging] Fwd: WaveCrypt Mihai Ionut
• [messaging] security notifications Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] security notifications Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Secure universal message addressing Natanael
  • Re: [messaging] [Endymail] Secure universal message addressing Natanael
  • Re: [messaging] [Endymail] Secure universal message addressing Harlan Lieberman-Berg
  • Re: [messaging] [Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Natanael
• [messaging] One CONIKS or many? Watson Ladd
  • Re: [messaging] One CONIKS or many? Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] One CONIKS or many? Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] One CONIKS or many? Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] One CONIKS or many? Marcela Melara
  • Re: [messaging] One CONIKS or many? Watson Ladd
  • Re: [messaging] One CONIKS or many? Marcela Melara
• [messaging] New location for the CONIKS website Marcela S. Melara
  • Re: [messaging] New location for the CONIKS website Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] abusing u2f elijah
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f elijah
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Joseph Birr-Pixton
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f elijah
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Michael Rogers
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f elijah
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f elijah
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f elijah
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Joseph Birr-Pixton
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Joseph Birr-Pixton
  • Re: [messaging] abusing u2f Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Verification of strict key change policy in CONIKS? Tao Effect
  • Re: [messaging] Verification of strict key change policy in CONIKS? Marcela S. Melara
  • Re: [messaging] Verification of strict key change policy in CONIKS? Tao Effect
  • Re: [messaging] Verification of strict key change policy in CONIKS? Marcela S. Melara
  • Re: [messaging] Verification of strict key change policy in CONIKS? Marcela S. Melara
  • Re: [messaging] Verification of strict key change policy in CONIKS? Marcela S. Melara
• Re: [messaging] Once again: Tor timing attacks and a Tor confession grarpamp
  • Re: [messaging] Once again: Tor timing attacks and a Tor confession grarpamp
• [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Ben Harris
  • Re: [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Ben Harris
  • Re: [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Nick Badger
  • Re: [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] Masking contact addresses with ECDH Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Ali Aydin Selcuk
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Jason Strange
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Chris Johnson
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Felix Eckhofer
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Chris Johnson
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Nick Badger
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Halil Kemal Taşkın
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Nick Badger
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Eric Mill
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Raphael Arias
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Halil Kemal Taşkın
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Halil Kemal Taşkın
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Sam Lanning
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Frederic Jacobs
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Chris Johnson
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Martin Thomson
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Sam Lanning
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Martin Thomson
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages David R. Andersen
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages David R. Andersen
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] encryption of Signal notification messages Watson Ladd
• [messaging] Two-pass DH instead commitment Van Gegel
  • Re: [messaging] Two-pass DH instead commitment Natanael
  • Re: [messaging] Two-pass DH instead commitment Van Gegel
  • Re: [messaging] Two-pass DH instead commitment Ben Harris
  • Re: [messaging] Two-pass DH instead commitment CodesInChaos
  • Re: [messaging] Two-pass DH instead commitment Van Gegel
  • Re: [messaging] Two-pass DH instead commitment Ben Harris
  • Re: [messaging] Two-pass DH instead commitment Van Gegel
• [messaging] 2nd Round CFC: Book on Smart Grid Security, IGI Global USA, - New deadline for proposal - March 5, 2016 Mohamed Amine FERRAG
• [messaging] saltpack spec and library Maxwell Krohn
  • Re: [messaging] saltpack spec and library Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] saltpack spec and library Natanael
  • [messaging] Fwd: saltpack spec and library Jack O'Connor
  • Re: [messaging] saltpack spec and library Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] saltpack spec and library Jack O'Connor
  • Re: [messaging] saltpack spec and library Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] saltpack spec and library Jack O'Connor
  • Re: [messaging] saltpack spec and library Mike Hearn
  • Re: [messaging] saltpack spec and library Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] saltpack spec and library Jack O'Connor
• [messaging] Two possible approaches to key transparency: CONIKS vs. VerSum Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] Two possible approaches to key transparency: CONIKS vs. VerSum Tony Arcieri
• Re: [messaging] Mail UIs Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Mail UIs Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] Mail UIs Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Short Authentication String usability study Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] SimplySecure offering UX and design help for encrypted messaging apps Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Max Skibinsky
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Max Skibinsky
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Max Skibinsky
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Ben Harris
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Max Skibinsky
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Ben Harris
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Ben Harris
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Max Skibinsky
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Ben Harris
  • Re: [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay Max Skibinsky
• [messaging] distributed social graph, was: collaborative random number generation carlo von lynX
  • Re: [messaging] distributed social graph, was: collaborative random number generation Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] distributed social graph, was: collaborative random number generation Karl
  • Re: [messaging] distributed social graph, was: collaborative random number generation carlo von lynX
  • Re: [messaging] distributed social graph, was: collaborative random number generation carlo von lynX
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation str4d
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation Natanael
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation Michael Rogers
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation Michael Rogers
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation Thomas Baigneres
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation Jeff Burdges
  • Re: [messaging] collaborative random number generation carlo von lynX
• Re: [messaging] Messaging Digest, Vol 357, Issue 1 Martin Dehnel-Wild
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Natanael
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Justin King-Lacroix
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Justin King-Lacroix
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Sam Lanning
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Justin King-Lacroix
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Sam Lanning
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Justin King-Lacroix
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Justin King-Lacroix
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? Tao Effect
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks? U.Mutlu
  • Re: [messaging] Messaging Digest, Vol 357, Issue 1 Martin Dehnel-Wild
  • Re: [messaging] Messaging Digest, Vol 357, Issue 1 U.Mutlu

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