Malicious clients may attempt HTTP request smuggling this way. This doesn't affect our current code as we only look for exact matches, but it could affect other servers behind a to-be-implemented reverse proxy built around our -httpd.
This doesn't affect users behind varnish at all, nor the HTTPS/HTTP reverse proxy I use (I don't know about nginx), but could be passed through by other reverse proxies. This change is only needed for HTTP::Parser::XS which most users probably use. Users of the pure Perl parser (via PLACK_HTTP_PARSER_PP=1) already hit 400 errors in this case, so this makes the common XS case consistent with the pure Perl case. cf. https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2006-33/ --- lib/PublicInbox/HTTP.pm | 1 + t/httpd-corner.t | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/PublicInbox/HTTP.pm b/lib/PublicInbox/HTTP.pm index 0f4b5047..18a19250 100644 --- a/lib/PublicInbox/HTTP.pm +++ b/lib/PublicInbox/HTTP.pm @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ sub event_step { # called by PublicInbox::DS } $self->do_read($rbuf, 8192, length($$rbuf)) or return; } + return quit($self, 400) if grep(/\s/, keys %env); # stop smugglers $$rbuf = substr($$rbuf, $r); my $len = input_prepare($self, \%env) // return write_err($self, undef); # EMFILE/ENFILE diff --git a/t/httpd-corner.t b/t/httpd-corner.t index cec754c9..0a613a9e 100644 --- a/t/httpd-corner.t +++ b/t/httpd-corner.t @@ -82,7 +82,12 @@ if ('test worker death') { like($body, qr/\A[0-9]+\z/, '/pid response'); isnt($body, $pid, 'respawned worker'); } - +{ + my $conn = conn_for($sock, 'Header spaces bogus'); + $conn->write("GET /empty HTTP/1.1\r\nSpaced-Out : 3\r\n\r\n"); + $conn->read(my $buf, 4096); + like($buf, qr!\AHTTP/1\.[0-9] 400 !, 'got 400 response on bad request'); +} { my $conn = conn_for($sock, 'streaming callback'); $conn->write("GET /callback HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n"); -- unsubscribe: one-click, see List-Unsubscribe header archive: https://public-inbox.org/meta/
