So what's the next step? How easily/quickly can Tuv (?) close the loophole
that has been created in 2.6.1 so "clone" (and other commands that have now
been disabled) can be made to work again in a protected stack? I am assuming
bribary is allowed?
And what's the workaround to allow 2.6.1 users access the features in a
protected stack with these requirements?
As Ken explained:
> No, what (Hugh) is saying is that currently we have the ability to unlock
a stack
> at runtime by setting the passkey. But you can't lock it back up again at
> runtime; the password will protect the stack *after* it's been closed and
> reopened (i.e. the passkey effect is temporary), but during the *session*
> while the stack is open, you can't "re-protect" it. This is something that
> is very much needed in order to "close the loop" on security.
/H
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