Let us imagine I want to solve a problem (probably the argument would be 
the same to proof a theorem, but I "see" this argument better applied to 
problems and exercises than to theorems).

I know how to solve the problem: the solution depends on say three 
well-known theorems, and just applying the axioms of predicate calculus in 
a reasonable way. The amount of steps is reasonably low.

So, if these three theorems were proved in metamath, everything would be 
easy.

However, it could be that these theorems are not proved in metamath (this 
is another question: how reasonable it is that metamath eventually covers 
an undergraduate degree material? Will the modularity, i.e. using 
metamath-proven theorems, eventually explode up the amounts of content in 
metamath? Or will proofs become more and more complex, even within an 
undergraduate level, without the possibility to apply modularity to them?).

One possibility is to abandon the project to provide the solution of the 
problem with metamath. But another possibility would be to try and 
"convert" the three theorems into some kind of definitions or axioms. Then, 
these three theorems would be true by definition, and one would only need 
to apply the axioms of predicate calculus to really solve the problem.

Does this approach make any sense? For proof of theorems, probably not, 
since there could eventually be a doubt whether a theorem had been really 
proved, or if it had been "proved" via "defining/axiomatizing" the hard 
parts of the proof. This would be unacceptable. But for problems/exercises, 
this should never(?) be a problem, I think.

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