For sake of discussion assume a partitioning scheme is such: /dev/sda1 => /boot /dev/sda2 => / /dev/sda3 => swap /dev/sda4 => spare
The *spare* partition will be encrypted and then mounted during startup. I know next to nothing about cryptography, cryptanalysis, and the like. All I know is that it is suggested to write random data over the disk before encrypting. For example, http://duncanelliot.com/blog/?p=7 In the above blog entry the claim is that if you do not somehow write random data over the entire disk an attacker can analyze the disk, locate the edges of the encrypted data, and greatly increase his/her chances of breaking the encryption. However, does this apply if one is only encrypting a single partition? By my understanding, the partition table is unencrypted and could potentially used to locate the starting edge of the encrypted partition. Does this fact negate whatever added security one gains by writing random data over the disk prior to encryption. I have been unable to find something that addresses this point exactly, so I am posting it here for discussion. Thanks, Adam Shea -- "Intelligence is the ability to avoid doing work, yet getting the work done." -Linus Torvalds
_______________________________________________ Mid-Hudson Valley Linux Users Group http://mhvlug.org http://mhvlug.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/mhvlug Upcoming Meetings (6pm - 8pm) MHVLS Auditorium Nov 3 - Open Source Hardware: Bugs, Beagles and Beyond Dec 1 - IBM's Open Client Deployment Jan 5 - Building a Comunity Site with Drupal
