Rob is worth a follow on LinkedIn.  Good analysis although I am surprised he 
doesn't mention the 50%+ UK ownership requirement that, in theory (?) 
Castlelake (American) and its majority owner Brookfield (Canadian) don't have.

Michael Rurik Halaby, FRAeS
UK mobile/WhatsApp: +447711298408
[email protected]
instagram: halabyaero
www.halaby.aero <http://www.halaby.aero/>



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From: GridPoint Consulting Limited <[email protected]>
Subject: Posts from GRIDPOINT CONSULTING for 05/31/2026
Date: 31 May 2026 at 17:04:17 BST
To: Michael <[email protected]>
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Latest from GridPoint Consulting
Updates and analysis from the GridPoint Consulting blog.

Castelake confirms interest in a potential bid for easyJet 
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By Robert Boyle on May 31, 2026 04:40 pm


Castlelake considering a bid

On Friday, the news broke that the US based alternative investment company 
Castlelake was considering a bid for easyJet. Castlelake has a history in 
aviation, including as an aircraft lessor and as a partner to Air France - KLM 
in the acquisition of SAS. It is not known at this point whether the company is 
working with any airline partners, or is considering a bid as a purely 
financial transaction.

What might they have in mind? And why has easyJet become a potential takeover 
target? I had a look.

Long term share price underperformance

It is perhaps not surprising that easyJet might have become a takeover target, 
given the performance of their shares over the last few years. At the end of 
2019, the company was valued at ÂŁ4.8 billion and that has fallen to only ÂŁ3 
billion today. In fact, it’s even worse than that, because the company raised 
£1.7 billion of fresh equity capital during COVID. So overall, that’s £3.5 
billion of shareholder value destruction.

In contrast, arch rival Ryanair has raised its value from €16 billion at the 
end of 2019 to €26 billion today. It did raise €400m of fresh equity during 
COVID, but it has spent over €2.4 billion in share buy backs since, giving an 
overall value creation of over €9 billion (£8 billion).

Another way of looking at is the share price performance (see following chart). 
Since the end of 2019, Ryanair’s shares are up 76% in sterling terms, whilst 
easyJet’s are down by 72%.

 

Source: Yahoo Finance

Pre-tax profits at easyJet did recover after big losses during COVID, getting 
back to similar absolute profit levels as before the pandemic. But adjusting 
for inflation they are down over 20%. Operating profit margins over the last 
twelve months of 5% were down from the 8-9% they used to make and compare 
poorly to Ryanair’s 15.8% margin for the same period.

 

Source: Company reports

 
Caught between a rock and a hard place

The huge rise in fuel prices since the latest phase of the Iran war has piled 
the pressure on easyJet’s management. On the one hand, the outlook for the 
profitability of their business has taken a hit. They are 72% hedged for the 
April to September period, but that still leaves 28% exposed. Their guidance on 
near term bookings didn’t suggest that they were having much success with 
passing on the fuel price increase. Ticket yield for their September quarter 
was described as “modestly up”.

At the same time, the value of their aircraft assets has been going up. Higher 
fuel prices have increased the urgency with which airlines want to bring in new 
more efficient aircraft, but aircraft and engine supply chains are still 
clogged. The value of easyJet’s fleet of largely unencumbered A320/321neo 
aircraft has become a material percentage of the value of the company. Taken 
together with high cash balances, the “sum of the parts” (SOTP) valuation of 
easyJet may be substantially in excess of the actual market capitalisation.

Such exercises are notoriously difficult, but I thought I’d give it a go to 
illustrate how Castlelake may be thinking.

Sum of the parts

At the end of March, easyJet had aircraft and spares assets of ÂŁ4.9 billion. 
That excluded their “right of use” aircraft assets, for which there is matching 
lease liability amount on the other side of the balance sheet. I had a go at 
building up a market value equivalent, using assumptions for the value of their 
208 owned aircraft, spare engines and other spares. I got to a figure of ÂŁ5.2 
billion. That’s a bit higher, but not a massive difference.

What is likely to be a bigger consideration is the value of their future order 
book. They have 287 firm orders and another 100 purchase rights. These are 
likely to have been placed at attractive prices. Boeing and Airbus normally 
offer airlines placing big orders better prices than they are willing to give 
to leasing companies. Taken together with the scarcity of delivery positions 
for A320/321neo aircraft, Castlelake may be assigning a significant value here. 
I’ve played with some figures, using $5m per A320neo position, $8m per A321neo 
position and $2.5m per purchase right. Are these figures correct? No, but they 
are not outlandish and suggest a “hidden value” of £1.6 billion.

As I mentioned earlier, easyJet has a lot of cash on its balance sheet. As at 
March 31st, they had cash of ÂŁ3.4 billion, which exceeded their ÂŁ2 billion of 
borrowings, leaving them with net cash of ÂŁ1.4 billion excluding lease 
liabilities. However, most of their cash is actually customer money - the value 
of tickets which have been sold but where the travel hasn’t taken place yet. It 
would be wrong to include the cash in a sum of the parts valuation without also 
including that ÂŁ3 billion liability.

There are some other working capital items that should be included too, notably 
ÂŁ1 billion of maintenance provisions, another ÂŁ1 billion of trade payables (net 
of receivables) and £0.8 billion of derivatives (“in the money” fuel hedges). A 
billion here, a billion there, can add up.

The last topic I want to discuss before I add up the numbers is the question of 
slots. The company has slots at quite a few slot constrained airports - this is 
one of the key differences between easyJet’s business model and that of the 
“ultra low cost carrier” models of Ryanair and Wizz. The Gatwick slots are 
probably the most valuable, with 196 daily pairs being worth perhaps ÂŁ500m at 
the ÂŁ2.5m per daily slot pair that past transactions might indicate. That price 
is probably too high in current market conditions, with carriers looking to cut 
back rather than expand. The second runway plan will also make airlines less 
likely to want to “pay up” for LGW slots. There is also a big difference 
between selling a few choice slots to a carrier with a specific need than 
trying to offload 46% of an entire airport. That’s not to say that the LGW 
position isn’t highly valuable, just that slot values are not a reliable way of 
assessing what you might get for selling it.

Elsewhere in Europe, easyJet has significant slot positions at other slot 
constrained airports, notably Amsterdam, Orly, Linate and Lisbon. Slots can’t 
be easily traded outside the UK, but there are mechanisms to do so if the value 
is high enough (e.g. moving the slots into a separate legal entity with an air 
operator certificate and then selling that company). For what it is worth, I am 
going to assume a total slot value of ÂŁ1 billion for the purposes of my SOTP 
fag packet.

Without further ado, here’s my SOTP valuation, which adds up to £5 billion 
compared to the £3 billion “pre-bid” market capitalisation, a 67% premium. 
That’s certainly enough to justify a hostile bid premium, if you believe that 
you have ways to capture the SOTP value. I’ll discuss that question in the next 
section.

 

 
A real plan

SOTP based valuations are interesting and thought provoking. But they are only 
relevant if you have an actual plan to realise that value. What might 
Castlelake have in mind?

The easiest part to understand would be the attraction to Castlelake of the 
order book, given its background as an aircraft lessor. Delivery positions and 
purchase rights are not normally transferrable, so without securing an 
agreement from Airbus, Castlelake would have to take delivery of the aircraft 
at easyJet first before moving them on to other customers. That’s a complexity 
but could be done if Airbus refuses to play ball.

Selling off part of easyJet’s order book would of course require a revision to 
the airline’s plans. Their core business plan probably doesn’t need all the 
aircraft orders and purchase rights, so a partial sale might not have that big 
an impact. Also, remember that easyJet’s current financial performance isn’t 
great, so Castlelake probably assume they could rationalise easyJet’s network 
and free up aircraft without undue damage to the airline’s profits and 
cashflows. That’s almost certainly true in the short term. The longer term 
strategic risk is that this would signal weakness to competitors (cough, 
Ryanair), who might decide that this would an excellent time to apply a bit of 
extra competitive pressure and persuade the financial types who are now in 
command to pull back even more and sell more assets.

It is of course quite possible that Castlelake believe that financial 
performance can be improved, or that the business is just undervalued compared 
to its potential. But could Castlelake be considering a radical breakup plan? 
There would be issues with competition regulators for most of the large 
European airlines if they tried to buy the whole of easyJet. Some of them don’t 
have the financial resources to buy the whole of the business anyway. But if 
Castlelake were willing to auction off the airline’s network and related slots 
in pieces, they might find buyers prepared to pay a premium given the synergies 
and strategic advantages they would achieve.

The Stelios angle

A complication here is the position of the original founder, Stelios, and his 
family companies. Together they own about 15% of easyJet and they might not 
take kindly to a hostile bid and breakup plan. A 50% takeover premium would be 
worth ÂŁ225m to them, but if it puts at risk the circa ÂŁ25m of brand licence 
payments they receive each year that probably isn’t attractive financially, 
even leaving aside any emotional considerations.

The Stelios “concert party” couldn’t block a hostile bidder from taking 
control, but they could probably prevent a “squeeze out” to get to 100%. 
Nevertheless, Castlelake might be prepared to take that risk, as achieving 
control is probably sufficient for them to capture the kinds of value they 
might be looking to achieve.

Watch this space

I think I’m going to leave it here for now. I’m sure there will be more to 
analyse over the comings days and weeks. Whether that is further details from 
Castlelake, competing bids, or a more comprehensive response from easyJet. The 
first interesting data point will be to see how much the share price jumps when 
the markets open tomorrow morning. That will tell us a lot about the market’s 
assessment of the likelihood of a bid actually emerging.

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