Myrtle Warren said:
> As far as I can tell, the specific construction of the output hash's preimage
> has not been determined. If we move forward with this mechanism, it becomes
> critically important that the hash covers the range proof itself. A situation
> where the hash resolves ambiguously should be avoided at all costs.
It should be sufficient for the output and its rangeproof to be separately
committed to the chain to prevent ambiguity. Committing to rangeproofs, which
are witness data and can be ignored (at a trust tradeoff), will reduce
flexibility.
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