On 7/24/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > MD5 isn't realy that secure and so I would like to have a rmd160 and sha1 > Checksum-file to ensure that I downloaded original stuff.
Changing the algorithm (or adding another, for that matter) will not provide greater proof of authenticity. Without some form of signature placed on them, hash values do not provide authenticity. All a check will tell you is whether the hash values match. Altering or recreating hash values is trivial, whether you use MD5 or any other algorithm. IIRC, MD5 is vulnerable to crafted input to the extent that it's possible to create collisions. To provide MessedWithOpenBSD, one would need to compromise the distribution system. Supposing such a thing happened, the attacker would have little trouble creating new checksum files. Given matching checksums, you won't detect anything wrong with the distribution set at the install stage.. Changing or adding algorithms is not an adequate solution to your worries. Signatures may be, once it's clear whose signature to trust and how to get that (group of) person(s) to sign off on everything on the FTP servers. For those interested, the people on the [EMAIL PROTECTED] list discussed this area during the last few days (for a project named BPG, the BSD Privacy Guard). Cheers, Rogier -- If you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there.
