Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
This kind of paranoia adds nothing to security (~/.ssh and others that
need it are already set to restrictive permissions), and there is no privacy from root no matter what. The rest is, again, personal preference and/or something about local policies.

Ever heart of a multiuser system where one user shouldn't be able to
acces the files of another user? Not all users are thinking about this
issue and many forget to change the modes for confidential files. IMO,

But keeping confidential files on "true" multiuser systems is stupid ... IMNSHO. And you cannot hide anything from the administrator. You depend on how well the admin is capable of securing the rest of the system and not have it rooted by a 3rd party(*) including the other users.

Other than that, I wrote how easy it is to close down the home directories - the permissions of everything in /etc/skel, the directory itself included, propagate to new user's homedirectories. After that, things like the umask don't matter at all, because only the user him/herself and root can enter the respective homes.

If I, as the admin, want or have to hide things from the users, then that's fine and not related to home directory permissions. Stuff like /etc/ssl/private. Other than that, I create new users for them to be able to work together, or with my own regular user account. Or, I create new users and give them certain administrative rights on a special purpose box. If I create new users for the sake of them having a Unix shell, then it's something different, but this is so very rare ... and there really shouldn't be any confidential things on such a multiuser shell server. Who says that the admin is any more trustworthy than some other, regular users?


Moritz

*: OpenBSD had only one remote hole in the default install, but a few more (very few, relatively speaking) local root vulnerabilities. And there are also still numerous ways of breaking OpenBSD inspite of sane defaults and exploit mitigation techniques in place.

In the end, it simply boils down on properly assessing risks, giving a box a defined purpose (even if it's an "eierlegende Wollmilchsau"(**)), and enforcing an appropriate security and usage policy. Solving social problems with social means is often enough the only viable way.

**: Rough translation: A fictional all-purpose animal; a sow that grows wool, gives milk and lays eggs.

Reply via email to