Making is a process.
Toast is not a process.

>----- ------- Original Message ------- -----
>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>To: misc@openbsd.org
>Sent: Fri, 23 Sep 2005 02:30:10
>
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>>> Security is everything you've ever said, plus a
>process.
>> 
>> If it is secure, it doesn't need a process. So
>why would security be a
>> process again? Because of the vendors making
>"mistakes" and fix it later?
>> 
>> Jimmy Scott
>
>It is a "process" in the same way that "making
>toast" is a process.
>The purchase of a "bread-crisping solution" that is
>UL-certified to not
>set your house on fire is the contribution of the
>"engineering" and
>"product development" stages.  In common usage,
>using this "solution"
>to toast your morning snack will produce crispy
>bread and will not
>produce a howling conflagration.  However, note
>that it is still very
>much possible to ignite your domicile by soaking a
>rag in lighter fluid,
>stuffing it into the bread-toasting slot, and
>jamming the switch closed
>with a butter knife.  For a less extreme example,
>it _may_ be possible
>to cause a fire by leaving a towel too near the
>toaster while it is
>operating, something which is easy to do and all
>too common.
>
>Having a morning snack and an un-burnt house at the
>same time, then, is
>contingent upon two things - possessing a toaster
>of adequate quality,
>and using it properly.  You don't get to have the
>whole package without
>a) looking for a good toaster in the first place,
>and b) learning how
>to use it.  Security operates similarly:  one boner
>mistake on anybody's
>part - coder, engineer or administrator - and your
>"security" vaporizes
>_instantly_.  Go read some of Bruce Schneier's
>screeds on the subject,
>they're informative.
>
>So yes, security most certainly _is_ partly a
>"process", various
>opinions to the contrary notwithstanding.  It is
>identical to the
>process of locking your doors and checking your
>windows before you
>go to bed at night, or of making sure that you're
>not stuffing a paper
>towel or a cardboard box top in your toaster in the
>morning before
>you've had coffee.  You could call it "habitual
>prudence", I suppose.
>
>Of course, computers being based on hard-core
>determinism and Boolean
>logic, a higher standard is possible.  I note in
>passing that the
>security of every operating system in common use
>(including OpenBSD) is
>_unproven_ [1], with the possible exception of
>Coyotos.  Asserting
>something that is unproven and which may actually
>be impossible to prove
>("X is more secure than Y") is not a good idea.  In
>other words, don't
>toss shit at the vendors unless you can _prove_,
>from a chain of
>irrefutable deduction, that your proposed solution
>is "more secure" than
>theirs.  (Something which is likely impossible, due
>to OpenBSD's design
>and the language in which it is written.)  Hint: 
>the manpower,
>brainpower, and computing power needed to
>accomplish this task _even if_
>it is possible is probably going to exceed anything
>you're willing to
>marshal to that end.
>
>Theo is right about one thing, however:  Bugs and
>security flaws arise
>from mistakes, every one of which is avoidable. 
>There are no "new"
>classes of bugs or design flaws, essentially every
>one has been
>generally known of and understood for decades.  It
>is only sloppy
>practices - dare I say it, "bad processes" - that
>permit these bugs
>to creep into various codebases and multiply.  The
>cure for this
>problem is "better processes".  The "easy" cure is
>for these processes
>to entail continuous auditing (the OBSD solution). 
>The harder cure
>is to work on establishing and maintaining a
>process that incorporates
>rigorous proof as a necessary component.  We may
>not ever see that, but
>hey - it's nice to dream, isn't it?
>
>-- 
>(c) 2005 Unscathed Haze via Central Plexus
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>I am Chaos.  I am alive, and I tell you that you
>are Free.  -Eris
>Big Brother is watching you.  Learn to become
>Invisible.
>|-------- Your message must be this wide to ride
>the Internet. --------|
>
>[1]  Rigorous proof, that is.  Anecdotal evidence
>does not establish
>proof of anything whatsoever.

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