> If your proposal is to error when the check fails, it will break
> hundreds of user machines.
>
> If your proposal is to emit a warning, it will emit multiple
> additional lines of output at boot for correct existing
> configurations.
>
> But you didn't implement a prototype, you didn't test it, yet you
> expect to be taken seriously.
it works fine on my system, where the mounts are default + source +
various external storage. i think most systems this breaks are
probably insecure and should use instead use a symlink as i described
in my original post. for the few custom setups where some user is
trusted not to overwrite a mount point (or where they should be able
to), it would not be hard to add a line
permit group trusty /usr/trusty
to a mount.conf file.
> You really don't seem to read.
is this because i did not reply to some of your point?
i felt doing so would have strayed beyond usefulness.
> Your comment about man.conf suggests we changed something which you
> hate and you want to wield it against us.
my point is that my impression of OpenBSD and your own policy has been
that it is acceptable to break a configuration to better security, and
that new users are not expected to become unix security gurus overnight.
> Your approach is hostile.
i am not the one insulting your ability with language.
