* Joachim Schipper <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2006-03-08 12:13]:

>       1. Use sudo exclusively - set an empty or nonsense root password

        Stupid - if there is only one user with sudo-ability then
this is the same as just having root. if there are more, there are
now two passwords out there to get root instead of just one. 

        Don't get me wrong, I love using sudo, and use it in lots of
places but view it as a tool for selectively openeing up security,
not tightening it down. 

>       2. Use public key authentication only for sshd(8), and restrict
> which users can log in.

        So they can expose their key on a bazillion remote systems
instead of the password on this system ? :)  This is a tradeoff, 
universal statements like this are frequently shit. allowing
public keys means you're now accepting the security of 
every machine an idiot ssh's from as good enough. My "most secure"
machines do not permit public keys. They also use pf.os to
encourage people not to ssh to them from less secure choices of
operating system.

>       2a. If you really need something password-like, use S/KEY.
>       2b. If neither is feasible, audit the passwords (use John the
> Ripper for existing passwords; some schemes exist to act when setting
> new passwords)
        
        Don't audit using John, users just cycle between shitty ones.
check them. (see passwordcheck in login.conf(5))

>       3. Restrict the use of ports, and research into the security of
> a program before installing. mail/postfix is unlikely to open too many
> holes; www/php5 is best left alone, if security is the goal [1].
>       4. Audit suid/sgid executables - quite a few are not needed on a
> minimalist system, but again - breaking stuff will lead to other stuff
> breaking. (Where 'audit' will typically mean 'remove any that are not
> needed' - the other end, a full source audit, is very, very
> time-consuming and difficult.)
>       5. Monitor the appropriate lists (did you know about the pf DoS
> problems in 3.8-rel? They are not in the patches, and very unlikely to
> cause trouble, but it's good to know what not to do).
> 
> Actually, regarding 1 - I find myself wondering whether logging in as
> root, where no suspicious stuff in my own account can reach me, is not
> preferable to using sudo (which is trivially subverted with a single
> line in .profile). Does anyone have a good opinion on this? (Yes, I know
> that root is not to be used for trivial matters, and yes, I know when to
> log out.)

        My "most secure" machines do not use sudo - there is only
root.  (on most of my machines however, I do use sudo). I use
sudo to make a machine a measured amount less secure (by allowing
more people high level access) than more secure. 

        -Bob

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