On 2025-10-11, Peter N. M. Hansteen <[email protected]> wrote: > For the comp* set, I would not be surprised if they contain bits that are > required > for the relink-at-boot process.
those pieces were moved from comp to base exactly for relink-at-boot. > Also, it could be argued that once an adversary has gained enough access that > they > are able to use development tools on your system, the likelihood that they > will > be able to upload and run their own tools is somewhere near a certainty. indeed. I don't think there's any way to stop someone who has access to a shell from writing a binary without highly restricting filesystem access, e.g. by making filesystems either not writable by !root, or mounting them with noexec, and that would also stop compilers being able to write to those places too. there are no setuid root programs in x*.tgz or comp*.tgz. -- Please keep replies on the mailing list.
