At this point, it's probably a good idea to point out there's a paper called Trusting Trust about your everyday C compiler...
On 12/6/07, Lars Noodin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hannah Schroeter wrote: > > ... > >> AFS is also encrypted, but unless its used to > >> get all the tarballs and make them accessible locally (e.g. make a cd) > >> it's not a help during the installation. > > > > I don't know enough about AFS to say anything about how to secure it > > from the beginning on. > > I'm not very knowledgeable, but have been looking at the documenation > lately: > http://www.openafs.org/pages/doc/AdminGuide/auagd007.htm#HDRWQ75 > > > ... > >> Given the existence of Windows servers (aka compromised machines) on > >> many networks, there are many chances for traffic to be intercepted, > >> often even DNS. So man-in-the-middle attacks appear to be theoretically > >> easy during the first part of an OpenBSD network installation. > > > > Yes, alas. And especially, for government "legal" interception, where > > they could legally enlist help from ISPs. > > So, intentional (corporate or government agreement with ISP) or > unintentional (use of M$ on ISP DNS server), could allow the initial > installation to become compromised, perhaps in a hard-to-detect way. > > None of this seems to be solved in the installation guide: > http://openbsd.org/faq/faq4.html > > Again, it looks like it might come down to keys or fingerprints and that > the network install might be depreciated. Rather, download, verify, > then install. > > -Lars > > -- http://www.glumbert.com/media/shift http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGvHNNOLnCk "This officer's men seem to follow him merely out of idle curiosity." -- Sandhurst officer cadet evaluation. "Securing an environment of Windows platforms from abuse - external or internal - is akin to trying to install sprinklers in a fireworks factory where smoking on the job is permitted." -- Gene Spafford
