OpenSMTPD 5.7.2 has just been released. OpenSMTPD is a FREE implementation of the SMTP protocol with some common extensions. It allows ordinary machines to exchange e-mails with systems speaking the SMTP protocol. It implements a fairly large part of RFC5321 and can already cover a large range of use-cases.
It runs on OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD, DragonFlyBSD, OSX and Linux. The archives are now available from the main site at www.OpenSMTPD.org We would like to thank the OpenSMTPD community for their help in testing the snapshots, reporting bugs, contributing code and packaging for other systems. This is a minor release with security and reliability fixes only. You are encouraged to update as soon as possible. The following issues, among others less critical, were discovered during a code audit performed by Qualys Security [https://www.qualys.com]. This has been a very impressive and valuable contribution to our project, and we'd like to thank them again for this ;-) Issues fixed in this release (since 5.7.1): =========================================== - an oversight in the portable version of fgetln() that allows attackers to read and write out-of-bounds memory; - multiple denial-of-service vulnerabilities that allow local users to kill or hang OpenSMTPD; - a stack-based buffer overflow that allows local users to crash OpenSMTPD, or execute arbitrary code as the non-chrooted _smtpd user; - a hardlink attack (or race-conditioned symlink attack) that allows local users to unset the chflags() of arbitrary files; - a hardlink attack that allows local users to read the first line of arbitrary files (for example, root's hash from /etc/master.passwd); - a denial-of-service vulnerability that allows remote attackers to fill OpenSMTPD's queue or mailbox hard-disk partition; - an out-of-bounds memory read that allows remote attackers to crash OpenSMTPD, or leak information and defeat the ASLR protection; - a use-after-free vulnerability that allows remote attackers to crash OpenSMTPD, or execute arbitrary code as the non-chrooted _smtpd user; Checksums: ========== SHA256 (opensmtpd-5.7.2.tar.gz) = e77bc57a4727233f4d725d06ccec4f89bca69fe6adabca6ee8f5683f8ac453fb SHA256 (opensmtpd-5.7.2p1.tar.gz) = daae044488d456b33aa9c84ebcc79aef2f9ab2d17ebe0c0f09e41e1f4b60d992 Verify: ======= Starting with version 5.7.1, releases are signed with signify(1). You can obtain the public key from our website, check with our community that it has not been altered on its way to your machine. Once you are confident the key is correct, you can verify the release as described below: 1- get the signature file corresponding to the tarball you're installing $ wget https://www.opensmtpd.org/archives/opensmtpd-5.7.2.sum.sig 2- check that the tarball matches the checksum: $ sha256 opensmtpd-5.7.2.tar.gz SHA256 (opensmtpd-5.7.2.tar.gz) = e77bc57a4727233f4d725d06ccec4f89bca69fe6adabca6ee8f5683f8ac453fb $ cat opensmtpd-5.7.2.sum.sig |tail -1 e77bc57a4727233f4d725d06ccec4f89bca69fe6adabca6ee8f5683f8ac453fb 3- verify that the signature file was not forged: $ signify -V -e -p opensmtpd.pub -m opensmtpd-5.7.2.sum Signature Verified Support: ======== You are encouraged to register to our general purpose mailing-list: http://www.opensmtpd.org/list.html The "Official" IRC channel for the project is at: #OpenSMTPD @ irc.freenode.net Reporting Bugs: =============== Please read http://www.opensmtpd.org/report.html Security bugs should be reported directly to [email protected] Other bugs may be reported to [email protected] OpenSMTPD is brought to you by Gilles Chehade, Eric Faurot and Sunil Nimmagadda. -- Gilles Chehade https://www.poolp.org @poolpOrg -- You received this mail because you are subscribed to [email protected] To unsubscribe, send a mail to: [email protected]
