The patch titled
fuse: clean up execute permission checking
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
fuse-clean-up-execute-permission-checking.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: fuse: clean up execute permission checking
From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Define a new function fuse_refresh_attributes() that conditionally refreshes
the attributes based on the validity timeout.
In fuse_permission() only refresh the attributes for checking the execute bits
if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/fuse/dir.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff -puN fs/fuse/dir.c~fuse-clean-up-execute-permission-checking fs/fuse/dir.c
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c~fuse-clean-up-execute-permission-checking
+++ a/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -695,6 +695,20 @@ static int fuse_do_getattr(struct inode
}
/*
+ * Check if attributes are still valid, and if not send a GETATTR
+ * request to refresh them.
+ */
+static int fuse_refresh_attributes(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
+
+ if (fi->i_time < get_jiffies_64())
+ return fuse_do_getattr(inode);
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Calling into a user-controlled filesystem gives the filesystem
* daemon ptrace-like capabilities over the requester process. This
* means, that the filesystem daemon is able to record the exact
@@ -770,7 +784,6 @@ static int fuse_access(struct inode *ino
static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
- struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
bool refreshed = false;
int err = 0;
@@ -778,12 +791,11 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode
return -EACCES;
/*
- * If attributes are needed, but are stale, refresh them
- * before proceeding
+ * If attributes are needed, refresh them before proceeding
*/
- if (((fc->flags & FUSE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS) || (mask & MAY_EXEC)) &&
- fi->i_time < get_jiffies_64()) {
- err = fuse_do_getattr(inode);
+ if ((fc->flags & FUSE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS) ||
+ ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))) {
+ err = fuse_refresh_attributes(inode);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -806,14 +818,17 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode
exist. So if permissions are revoked this won't be
noticed immediately, only after the attribute
timeout has expired */
-
- } else {
- int mode = inode->i_mode;
- if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && !S_ISDIR(mode) && !(mode & S_IXUGO))
- return -EACCES;
-
- if (nd && (nd->flags & (LOOKUP_ACCESS | LOOKUP_CHDIR)))
- return fuse_access(inode, mask);
+ } else if (nd && (nd->flags & (LOOKUP_ACCESS | LOOKUP_CHDIR))) {
+ err = fuse_access(inode, mask);
+ } else if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
+ if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO)) {
+ if (refreshed)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ err = fuse_do_getattr(inode);
+ if (!err && !(inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
}
return err;
}
@@ -1046,14 +1061,12 @@ static int fuse_getattr(struct vfsmount
struct inode *inode = entry->d_inode;
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
- int err = 0;
+ int err;
if (!fuse_allow_task(fc, current))
return -EACCES;
- if (fi->i_time < get_jiffies_64())
- err = fuse_do_getattr(inode);
-
+ err = fuse_refresh_attributes(inode);
if (!err) {
generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
stat->mode = fi->orig_i_mode;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from [EMAIL PROTECTED] are
origin.patch
unprivileged-mounts-add-user-mounts-to-the-kernel.patch
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-umount.patch
unprivileged-mounts-account-user-mounts.patch
unprivileged-mounts-propagate-error-values-from-clone_mnt.patch
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-bind-mounts.patch
unprivileged-mounts-put-declaration-of-put_filesystem-in-fsh.patch
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-mounts.patch
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-mounts-fix-subtype-handling.patch
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-fuse-mounts.patch
unprivileged-mounts-propagation-inherit-owner-from-parent.patch
unprivileged-mounts-propagation-inherit-owner-from-parent-fix-for-git-audit.patch
unprivileged-mounts-add-no-submounts-flag.patch
r-o-bind-mounts-sys_mknodat-elevate-write-count-for-vfs_mknod-create-fix.patch
slab-api-remove-useless-ctor-parameter-and-reorder-parameters-vs-revoke.patch
fs-introduce-write_begin-write_end-and-perform_write-aops-revoke-fix.patch
fuse-fix-allowing-operations.patch
fuse-fix-race-between-getattr-and-write.patch
fuse-fix-race-between-getattr-and-write-checkpatch-fixes.patch
fuse-add-file-handle-to-getattr-operation.patch
fuse-add-file-handle-to-getattr-operation-checkpatch-fixes.patch
fuse-clean-up-open-file-passing-in-setattr.patch
vfs-allow-filesystems-to-implement-atomic-opentruncate.patch
fuse-improve-utimes-support.patch
fuse-add-atomic-opentruncate-support.patch
fuse-support-bsd-locking-semantics.patch
fuse-add-list-of-writable-files-to-fuse_inode.patch
fuse-add-helper-for-asynchronous-writes.patch
fuse-add-support-for-mandatory-locking.patch
fuse-add-blksize-field-to-fuse_attr.patch
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in
the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
