The patch titled
     unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged bind mounts
has been removed from the -mm tree.  Its filename was
     unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-bind-mounts.patch

This patch was dropped because an updated version will be merged

------------------------------------------------------
Subject: unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged bind mounts
From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

Allow bind mounts to unprivileged users if the following conditions are met:

  - mountpoint is not a symlink
  - parent mount is owned by the user
  - the number of user mounts is below the maximum

Unprivileged mounts imply MS_SETUSER, and will also have the "nosuid" and
"nodev" mount flags set.

In particular, if mounting process doesn't have CAP_SETUID capability,
then the "nosuid" flag will be added, and if it doesn't have CAP_MKNOD
capability, then the "nodev" flag will be added.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Ram Pai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---

 fs/namespace.c |   81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff -puN fs/namespace.c~unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-bind-mounts 
fs/namespace.c
--- a/fs/namespace.c~unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-bind-mounts
+++ a/fs/namespace.c
@@ -238,11 +238,34 @@ static void dec_nr_user_mounts(void)
        spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
 }
 
-static void set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
+static int reserve_user_mount(void)
+{
+       int err = 0;
+
+       spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
+       if (nr_user_mounts >= max_user_mounts && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               err = -EPERM;
+       else
+               nr_user_mounts++;
+       spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
+       return err;
+}
+
+static void __set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
 {
        BUG_ON(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_USER);
        mnt->mnt_uid = current->fsuid;
        mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_USER;
+
+       if (!capable(CAP_SETUID))
+               mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID;
+       if (!capable(CAP_MKNOD))
+               mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
+}
+
+static void set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+       __set_mnt_user(mnt);
        spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
        nr_user_mounts++;
        spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
@@ -261,10 +284,16 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct
                                        int flag)
 {
        struct super_block *sb = old->mnt_sb;
-       struct vfsmount *mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
+       struct vfsmount *mnt;
 
+       if (flag & CL_SETUSER) {
+               int err = reserve_user_mount();
+               if (err)
+                       return ERR_PTR(err);
+       }
+       mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
        if (!mnt)
-               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+               goto alloc_failed;
 
        mnt->mnt_flags = old->mnt_flags;
        atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
@@ -276,7 +305,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct
        /* don't copy the MNT_USER flag */
        mnt->mnt_flags &= ~MNT_USER;
        if (flag & CL_SETUSER)
-               set_mnt_user(mnt);
+               __set_mnt_user(mnt);
 
        if (flag & CL_SLAVE) {
                list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave_list);
@@ -301,6 +330,11 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct
                spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
        }
        return mnt;
+
+ alloc_failed:
+       if (flag & CL_SETUSER)
+               dec_nr_user_mounts();
+       return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 }
 
 static inline void __mntput(struct vfsmount *mnt)
@@ -724,22 +758,26 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oldumount(char __use
 
 #endif
 
-static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidata *nd)
+/*
+ * Conditions for unprivileged mounts are:
+ * - mountpoint is not a symlink
+ * - mountpoint is in a mount owned by the user
+ */
+static bool permit_mount(struct nameidata *nd, int *flags)
 {
+       struct inode *inode = nd->dentry->d_inode;
+
        if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-               return 0;
-       return -EPERM;
-#ifdef notyet
-       if (S_ISLNK(nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
-               return -EPERM;
-       if (nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) {
-               if (current->uid != nd->dentry->d_inode->i_uid)
-                       return -EPERM;
-       }
-       if (vfs_permission(nd, MAY_WRITE))
-               return -EPERM;
-       return 0;
-#endif
+               return true;
+
+       if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
+               return false;
+
+       if (!is_mount_owner(nd->mnt, current->fsuid))
+               return false;
+
+       *flags |= MS_SETUSER;
+       return true;
 }
 
 static int lives_below_in_same_fs(struct dentry *d, struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -983,9 +1021,10 @@ static int do_loopback(struct nameidata 
        int clone_flags;
        struct nameidata old_nd;
        struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;
-       int err = mount_is_safe(nd);
-       if (err)
-               return err;
+       int err;
+
+       if (!permit_mount(nd, &flags))
+               return -EPERM;
        if (!old_name || !*old_name)
                return -EINVAL;
        err = path_lookup(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_nd);
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from [EMAIL PROTECTED] are

fuse-fix-reading-past-eof.patch
fuse-cleanup-add-fuse_get_attr_version.patch
fuse-pass-open-flags-to-read-and-write.patch
fuse-fix-fuse_file_ops-sending.patch
fuse-fix-uninitialized-field-in-fuse_inode.patch
fuse-fix-attribute-caching-after-rename.patch
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-bind-mounts.patch
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-mounts.patch
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-fuse-mounts.patch
unprivileged-mounts-propagation-inherit-owner-from-parent.patch
unprivileged-mounts-add-no-submounts-flag.patch
slab-api-remove-useless-ctor-parameter-and-reorder-parameters-vs-revoke.patch
fs-introduce-write_begin-write_end-and-perform_write-aops-revoke-fix.patch

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