The patch titled
unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged fuse mounts
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-fuse-mounts.patch
This patch was dropped because an updated version will be merged
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged fuse mounts
From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Use FS_SAFE for "fuse" fs type, but not for "fuseblk".
FUSE was designed from the beginning to be safe for unprivileged users. This
has also been verified in practice over many years. In addition unprivileged
mounts require the parent mount to be owned by the user, which is more strict
than the current userspace policy.
This will enable future installations to remove the suid-root fusermount
utility.
Don't require the "user_id=" and "group_id=" options for unprivileged mounts,
but if they are present, verify them for sanity.
Disallow the "allow_other" option for unprivileged mounts.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Ram Pai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/fuse/inode.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff -puN fs/fuse/inode.c~unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-fuse-mounts
fs/fuse/inode.c
--- a/fs/fuse/inode.c~unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-fuse-mounts
+++ a/fs/fuse/inode.c
@@ -362,6 +362,19 @@ static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, str
d->max_read = ~0;
d->blksize = 512;
+ /*
+ * For unprivileged mounts use current uid/gid. Still allow
+ * "user_id" and "group_id" options for compatibility, but
+ * only if they match these values.
+ */
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ d->user_id = current->uid;
+ d->user_id_present = 1;
+ d->group_id = current->gid;
+ d->group_id_present = 1;
+
+ }
+
while ((p = strsep(&opt, ",")) != NULL) {
int token;
int value;
@@ -390,6 +403,8 @@ static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, str
case OPT_USER_ID:
if (match_int(&args[0], &value))
return 0;
+ if (d->user_id_present && d->user_id != value)
+ return 0;
d->user_id = value;
d->user_id_present = 1;
break;
@@ -397,6 +412,8 @@ static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, str
case OPT_GROUP_ID:
if (match_int(&args[0], &value))
return 0;
+ if (d->group_id_present && d->group_id != value)
+ return 0;
d->group_id = value;
d->group_id_present = 1;
break;
@@ -602,6 +619,10 @@ static int fuse_fill_super(struct super_
if (!parse_fuse_opt((char *) data, &d, is_bdev))
return -EINVAL;
+ /* This is a privileged option */
+ if ((d.flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (is_bdev) {
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, d.blksize))
@@ -702,9 +723,9 @@ static int fuse_get_sb(struct file_syste
static struct file_system_type fuse_fs_type = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "fuse",
- .fs_flags = FS_HAS_SUBTYPE,
.get_sb = fuse_get_sb,
.kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
+ .fs_flags = FS_HAS_SUBTYPE | FS_SAFE,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from [EMAIL PROTECTED] are
fuse-fix-reading-past-eof.patch
fuse-cleanup-add-fuse_get_attr_version.patch
fuse-pass-open-flags-to-read-and-write.patch
fuse-fix-fuse_file_ops-sending.patch
fuse-fix-uninitialized-field-in-fuse_inode.patch
fuse-fix-attribute-caching-after-rename.patch
unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-fuse-mounts.patch
unprivileged-mounts-propagation-inherit-owner-from-parent.patch
unprivileged-mounts-add-no-submounts-flag.patch
slab-api-remove-useless-ctor-parameter-and-reorder-parameters-vs-revoke.patch
fs-introduce-write_begin-write_end-and-perform_write-aops-revoke-fix.patch
-
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