The patch titled
Fix filesystem capability support
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
fix-filesystem-capability-support.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Fix filesystem capability support
From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
In linux-2.6.24-rc1, security/commoncap.c:cap_inh_is_capped() was
introduced. It has the exact reverse of its intended behavior. This
led to an unintended privilege esculation involving a process'
inheritable capability set.
To be exposed to this bug, you need to have Filesystem Capabilities
enabled and in use. That is:
- CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES must be defined for the buggy code
to be compiled in.
- You also need to have files on your system marked with fI bits raised.
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/commoncap.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff -puN security/commoncap.c~fix-filesystem-capability-support
security/commoncap.c
--- a/security/commoncap.c~fix-filesystem-capability-support
+++ a/security/commoncap.c
@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
+/*
+ * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
+ * function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable()
+ * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
+ * returns 1 for this case.
+ */
int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
/* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
@@ -107,10 +113,11 @@ static inline int cap_block_setpcap(stru
static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
{
/*
- * return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
- * to the old permitted set.
+ * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
+ * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
+ * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
*/
- return !cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP);
+ return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
}
#else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from [EMAIL PROTECTED] are
revert-capabilities-clean-up-file-capability-reading.patch
revert-capabilities-clean-up-file-capability-reading-checkpatch-fixes.patch
add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel.patch
add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-checkpatch-fixes.patch
add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix.patch
add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix-fix.patch
add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix-modify-old-libcap-warning-message.patch
add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix-modify-old-libcap-warning-message-checkpatch-fixes.patch
add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix-modify-old-libcap-warning-message-fix.patch
64bit-capability-support-legacy-support-fix.patch
remove-unnecessary-include-from-include-linux-capabilityh.patch
capabilities-introduce-per-process-capability-bounding-set.patch
oom_kill-remove-uid==0-checks.patch
smack-version-11c-simplified-mandatory-access-control-kernel.patch
smack-using-capabilities-32-and-33.patch
smack-mutex-capability-pointers-and-spelling-cleanup.patch
smack-socket-label-setting-fix.patch
proc-seqfile-convert-proc_pid_status-to-properly-handle-pid-namespaces.patch
proc-seqfile-convert-proc_pid_status-to-properly-handle-pid-namespaces-checkpatch-fixes.patch
proc-seqfile-convert-proc_pid_status-to-properly-handle-pid-namespaces-fix.patch
-
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