The patch titled
Smack: update for file capabilities
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
smack-update-for-file-capabilities.patch
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The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Smack: update for file capabilities
From: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability "module"
as a secondary LSM. Integrate the new hooks required for file based
capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff -puN security/smack/smack_lsm.c~smack-update-for-file-capabilities
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c~smack-update-for-file-capabilities
+++ a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -584,14 +584,20 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vf
static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
- if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0)
- return -EPERM;
- }
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ } else
+ rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
- return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+ return rc;
}
/**
@@ -658,10 +664,20 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct d
*/
static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
{
- if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 && !capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ int rc = 0;
- return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ } else
+ rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+
+ return rc;
}
/**
@@ -1016,7 +1032,12 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct t
*/
static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return rc;
}
/**
@@ -1028,7 +1049,12 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct tas
*/
static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return rc;
}
/**
@@ -1053,7 +1079,12 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct t
static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
struct sched_param *lp)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return rc;
}
/**
@@ -1093,6 +1124,11 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct
static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
/*
* Special cases where signals really ought to go through
* in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
@@ -1776,6 +1812,27 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct k
return smk_curacc(isp, may);
}
+/* module stacking operations */
+
+/**
+ * smack_register_security - stack capability module
+ * @name: module name
+ * @ops: module operations - ignored
+ *
+ * Allow the capability module to register.
+ */
+static int smack_register_security(const char *name,
+ struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
+ __func__, name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
* @opt_dentry: unused
@@ -2393,6 +2450,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_
.inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr,
.inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr,
.inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr,
+ .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv,
+ .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv,
.inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity,
.inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity,
.inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -2452,6 +2511,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_
.netlink_send = cap_netlink_send,
.netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv,
+ .register_security = smack_register_security,
+
.d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate,
.getprocattr = smack_getprocattr,
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from [EMAIL PROTECTED] are
smack-update-for-file-capabilities.patch
-
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