Please do not reply to this email- if you want to comment on the bug, go to the URL shown below and enter your comments there.
Changed by [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bugzilla.ximian.com/show_bug.cgi?id=77340 --- shadow/77340 2006-07-31 12:06:56.000000000 -0400 +++ shadow/77340.tmp.13924 2006-08-30 06:13:20.000000000 -0400 @@ -85,6 +85,25 @@ I am aware that -l: can be used to pick a lock location that isn't as insecure as /tmp. However, I believe that if the default invocation of mono-service opens a security hole (due to reckless usage of /tmp), it is something that should be fixed or, at the very least, the openness to attacks should be documented in block letters. + +------- Additional Comments From [EMAIL PROTECTED] 2006-08-30 06:13 ------- +Sorry, that I haven't found this bug until now. + +Some thoughts about this: +Would it improve security to open the file using OpenFlags.O_NOFOLLOW? +This should prevent symlink attacks. Putting the lock file to /var/run +as default seems also reasonable to me. + +To Alp: The redirection happens to avoid any console output. This +should run as/like a daemon shouldn't it? Any error messages of +mono-service go to the system log. When mono-service was still C code +the forking was done inside the daemon. This was factored out to the +shell script because it could not be easily done in C#. As someone +with not much shell scripting experience I don't know what you mean +with "The +shell script is a total hack. It's unsupportable and should not ship +in its current state." Do you have any suggestions for improvement of +this script? _______________________________________________ mono-bugs maillist - [email protected] http://lists.ximian.com/mailman/listinfo/mono-bugs
