Hi Bo --
I'd like to take your comments step-by-step, if you don't mind, since you
sometimes lose me in the details. For instance, you said:
> Defining may be to differentiate, but can we do anything else?
Do you mean SHOULD we do anything else, or that differentiating is
everything we do? I could possibly accept either of those meanings.
> However, I have the impression that to most people around this
> discussion defining means "irreal, subjective, in our minds only",
> in contrast to an undefined (dynamic) but objective reality
>"out there".
What does "irreal" mean? It sounds like "unreal", but I can't find it in
the dictionary. What is "in our minds" is experience, and experience is as
real as it gets in our existence. So, from my essentialist point of view,
there is no difference between "in here" and "out there" when it comes to
objective reality. In fact, the only fundamental difference in existence is
the division of sensible awareness from objective beingness. It's what I
call the dichotomy of being-aware.
> And my contention is that this is SOM and (in MOQ's case)
> by postulating the real chasm to be between the dynamic
> Quality and the MOQ - not between DQ/DQ - Pirsig fell
> victim to the enemy he set out to conquer.
I have never assumed that DQ could be split, any more than that Essence
could be split. So this argument is wasted on me. I'm more interested in
how you arrive at the S/O split as derived from indivisible Quality.
> But the people of this site are impossible to bring "to justice" they lift
> themselves out of all corners they have painted themselves into by the
> "Oriental Rope Trick".
I call it a "sleight-of-hand" trick -- or to use Baron Munchausen's analogy,
"pulling oneself up by his bootstraps"...but no matter.
> If your MoE's primary division is between an undifferentiated
> essence and a differentiated such we agree, but - as said -
> in MOQ's case Pirsig made the division between an
> undifferentiated Quality and the theory about such a division
> - and was up to his neck in SOM.
I have a problem accepting Quality as the "creator" in the first place, so
confusing the name of a philosophy with its ontology only compounds my
difficulty.
> If we are at odds or not ... let me try this and see if it
> rings bells. I start with language. My thesis is that
> language must be suspended, making it sound as if
> language is something secondary to what it is about
> is SOM (Plato's shadows on the cave walls)
> And this applies to "mind" and/or "man", these terms
> are variants of the language example.
I agree to remove language (i.e., the descriptive terms) from the
metaphysics, since it is the concepts, not the words or names, that are
important. However, for me, the subjective individual--whether one calls it
"man", "self", or "mind" as distinct from all otherness -- is a concept I'm
not willing to rid myself of. That existence is a self/other dichotomy is
fundamental to my philosophy.
I previously suggested that "we are all SOMists by virtue of our experience
in the world".
> Well, this was my frustration, I mean that all who subscribe
> to the above sketched fallacy are SOMists. Not those who
> see the SOL ("sun" in Scandinavian)
If I have not imposed an obstacle by holding out for individuation of the
subjective self, please continue. Otherwise, we can discuss what is meant
by individuation (or the actualization of finitude).
Essentially yours,
Ham
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