Hi Matt,

You conlcuded
"It is only by really caring, not only in what the other person is
going to say, but in what they _want to say_--in more than a
dialectical game of "Gotcha!"--that we are going to have quality
conversations."

Agreed, and I must have "complained" about that "dialectical game of
gotcha" a hundred times myself. Motivations matter and anyone whose
motivation is to win an argument has missed the point. The point as
you say is to achieve - by finding it or constructing it - mutual
understanding. Analysis is only ever a means to that end, and never
the point in itself.

Ian

On Sat, May 17, 2008 at 4:11 PM, Matt Kundert
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I first gained whatever meager measure of notoriety in the MD from a post 
> many years ago in which I short-sightedly used a religious piety metaphor to 
> develop and layer some views I'd come to hold about Pirsig, philosophical 
> discourse, and practical conversation.  People, however, took the metaphor a 
> lot more seriously than I did and some of what I was saying got lost in 
> translation.  But the issue I was trying to highlight, and that I continue to 
> come back to frequently, is the interconnection between our philosophies and 
> our conduct, specifically our conduct in engaging other philosophers, and in 
> particular our conduct on the MD.
>
> Then, as now, my attention shifts in this direction when I see hang-ups in 
> present conversations, particularly ones I see as needless.  We can draw 
> great patterns in the back-and-forth between major contributors, those whose 
> voice is heard frequently and loudly, and I have done so on many different 
> occasions.  I would presently like to focus on a controversy that has floated 
> around Platt for as long as I have been here.  Everybody, by now, knows the 
> pattern of Platt's argument: if you deny Absolute Truth, Platt will ask if 
> that truth you just stated is absolute.
>
> After watching Platt in conversation for years, it is unclear to me his 
> motivation for asking it.  Motivation is very important in handling a 
> conversation because if you don't know why an interlocutor is asking a 
> question, you may perceive the substance of their question wrongly and so 
> offer an answer that is off the point they wished to make.  Some participants 
> at the MD make it their business to obscure their motivations, which is their 
> prerogative, but it sometimes makes tedious conversation.  What I've seen in 
> the pattern of Platt's conversation--which has the virtue of consistency, 
> making it easier to identify Platt's position--is a certain improvisational 
> quality in relation to his opponent over the question of relativism that has 
> made it difficult, on this question, to see why he's saying anything at all.  
> This has produced frustrations over the years.
>
> I came to terms with Platt's position some years ago when I finally saw its 
> overall pattern.  Platt's position on truth stems from a specific attitude 
> about the nature of discourse, and specifically of assertion.  This position 
> sees an assertion as something that, by its very nature of being an 
> assertion, requires what is asserted to have the status of something that is 
> true for everybody, everywhere, at all times.  This position does not require 
> us to believe in a mythical being called "Absolute Truth" that hangs in the 
> sky at right angles to our vision.  All it requires is the understanding of 
> assertion that says that "to assert" is to forward a competitor in the 
> marketplace of ideas, and the only non-sophistical reason for asserting one 
> idea over another is because you believe it to be the best idea, i.e. you are 
> betting that this idea will, in the fullness of time, defeat all comers.
>
> This view of truth has distant roots in Plato, but its more modern relation 
> is in Kant, which is extended by Peirce, and come back full force in Germany 
> with Jurgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel.  In this view, to assert that truth 
> is not absolute in some sense is to assert a position on _assertion_ that 
> denies your very act of asserting it.  This is what Habermas called a 
> "performative contradiction": your performance contradicts what you are 
> saying in the performance.
>
> Finally understanding the roots of Platt's position, or anyone's for that 
> matter, allows us to engage with it fruitfully.  Instead of going back forth 
> about "absolute truth," which is an ambiguous moniker that has a long history 
> of varied philosophical freight being attached to it, a conversation that 
> goes around in circles because everyone gets to just revert to their own 
> understanding of the constellation of terms and ideas that get associated 
> with it, instead of that conversation--which can be fun, but after you've had 
> it a few times you get bored--you can have a conversation that leads to 
> mutual understanding.  Dialectical victory over a real, living philosophical 
> opponent is a rare thing.  Far more often is it the case that all that can, 
> and should, be hoped for is a mutually shared understanding of the other 
> person's position.  Habermas and Richard Rorty fruitfully disagreed over the 
> nature of assertion for years, but they did it fruitfully because they tried 
> desperat
 ely to find the core issue at which they were disagreeing and talk about it in 
a manner that hoped to elicit further enunciation and sophisticated 
articulation of their own position in relation to this fundamental 
disagreement.  A core philosophical disagreement will extend out in waves over 
a philosophy until at the limits, it just seems on the surface that the other 
guy said something wrong or stupid.  This is rarely the case, and the principle 
of charity, a principle of intellectual discourse that begs all sides to 
construe another's ideas in as favorable light as possible before finally 
judging them, requires it to never be the case.
>
> Platt isn't always the best at articulating his position, but as someone that 
> also has problems in communication, I feel acutely the pain of being 
> inarticulate and assuming a degree of responsibility over misunderstanding.  
> I'm as good a living example of the problems of conversation as they come: 
> I've used metaphors inadvisably; I've made arguments with missing 
> premises--and conclusions; I've written narratives that meander and bird-walk 
> without a point; I still write prosaically enough that it seems like you 
> should be able to understand it, but the content of which is fairly 
> unintelligible for all kinds of reasons, often having to do with the fact 
> that you haven't read enough of the same books as I have.  And is that a good 
> reason?  "To Read Matt's Posts, You Must Have Done the Following Required 
> Reading: 1) Rorty's Philosophy and the ...."
>
> We all have different motivations for coming here, different things we are 
> looking for, and we all have different styles, different voices, different 
> modes of engagement.  Some are innocent soul-searchers, some hide in a sea of 
> irony.  Some write autobiographically, weaving in examples from their life, 
> some stick to a play of abstract concepts.  Some lack good grammar or a 
> spellchecker, some look like they just finished Freshman English.  Some look 
> like they hit "Enter" randomly as they write.
>
> I don't think there is any right way to communicate, I don't think there is 
> any right way to write.  I don't think there is any single thing called 
> "plain spoken" and I don't think we should be quick to judge a certain style 
> as lacking insight or wisdom.  Every style is able to convey wisdom, it is 
> just a matter of finding out what.  In my tenure at the MD, I've employed 
> just about every rhetorical format, genre, strategy, tactic, technique, 
> gesture and gambit.  I've been condescending, sarcastic, conciliatory, 
> polite.  I've obfuscated intention, innocently questioned, suggestively 
> probed, quickly damned and disregarded.  I've told good jokes, bad jokes, 
> conceptual jokes, joke jokes.  I've used commas, colons, semicolons, 
> parentheticals, ellipses, litotes.  I've used metaphor, analogy, allegory, 
> alliteration, allusion, sleight of hand, stuff from Aristotle's Rhetoric that 
> I didn't even know I was doing.  I've used arguments, made comparisons, told 
> stories, dropped names, cr
 eated long lists (a practice not done much anymore, since the time of Emerson, 
when most writings had first been speakings).
>
> I've done all these things for different reasons at different times, 
> sometimes self-consciously, sometimes unconsciously and habitually.  The only 
> two forms I don't think I have employed (I even recently wrote a poem for 
> Marsha, though it was a sonnet and not the free verse most people write 
> around here) are the dialogue and stream-of-consciousness proem, the former 
> because it requires too much creativity on my part and the latter because I 
> lack the artful ability to mimic the lack of artful ability (some do it so 
> naturally, but it just seems so forced when I do it).
>
> I think the main post-it we should tag alongside our computer monitors for 
> when we read MD contributions is "aim for mutual understanding."  Good 
> philosophical positions are intractable, which is itself a philosophical 
> position, so let me say to the more practical point--almost all living, 
> breathing philosophers are intractable in their core beliefs.  Sometimes we 
> just don't know which beliefs we are holding are core, and philosophy helps 
> elicit that as our understanding of what we take to be important in 
> philosophy, and life, ebbs and flows.  But we all know that most of the time, 
> in these conversations, with these conversational partners, there are a lot 
> of feet stuck in the mud, a lot of dug-in trenches.  Whenever you encounter 
> one, whenever you think to yourself, "God, that person is just being stubborn 
> about X!", just remember that if someone else is being stubborn about X, that 
> means you are being stubborn, too.  The question then is: what do you do now? 
>  How do you m
 ove forward?
>
> Much of the philosophy that occurs here, and with good reason, is what the 
> Greeks called eristic, virtuoso displays of dialectical agility that focus 
> polemically on the current opponent.  I think good philosophy should focus on 
> the current person you are talking to, but if it is to have lasting value, it 
> needs to say something to a wider audience than that.  If we apply charity to 
> each other's writings, we will make this process easier, as we rise above 
> possible mistakes or indefensible wrong turns to the core matters that, well, 
> matter.  We need to ruminate on the best possible version of what a person 
> says, as we are sometimes inarticulate and still searching for what that best 
> possible version is.  It is only by really caring, not only in what the other 
> person is going to say, but in what they _want to say_--in more than a 
> dialectical game of "Gotcha!"--that we are going to have quality 
> conversations.
>
> Matt
> _________________________________________________________________
> Change the world with e-mail. Join the i'm Initiative from Microsoft.
> http://im.live.com/Messenger/IM/Join/Default.aspx?source=EML_WL_ChangeWorld
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
> Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
> http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
>
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/

Reply via email to