Ron:
The last post on this particular problem for today, I swear.

When Pirsig wrote:
*) LILA:
    This problem of trying to describe value in terms of substance 
    has been the problem of a smaller container trying to contain a 
    larger one.  Value is not a subspecies of substance.  
    Substance is a subspecies of value. When you reverse the 
    containment process and define substance in terms of value 
    the mystery disappears: substance is a "stable pattern of 
    inorganic values."  The problem then disappears.  The world of 
    objects and the world of values is unified. 

He mistakenly gave the impression of a meta-objectivism. which contradicts
the statement of Value or Quality (ultimate reality) as being indefineable.

By stating that substance IS a "stable pattern of inorganic values"
He unwittingly alludes to a meta-objectivists view. When the remainder
of his Metaphysic states that substance is an intellectual pattern
ABOUT  "stable patterns of inorganic values".

THIS causes a huge problem in the road to understanding and occurs several
times throughout the book enough so that Bo is justified in his interpretation.

Major set back in my opinion and the one REAL flaw in Pirsigs work.


      
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