> [Krimel] > I take Craig and possibly Pirsig to be saying, that there are relationships, processes, distinctions that exist independently of any conceptual patterns of them.
Dan: Yes I think that's what Craig is saying. I've been over this quote literally a thousand times but I don't see Mr Pirsig possibly saying "that there are relationships, processes, distinctions that exist independently of any conceptual patterns of them". If he did, it would contradict what he says here: "In this plain of understanding static patterns of value are divided into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all there are. If you construct an encyclopedia of four topics-Inorganic, Biological, Social and Intellectual-nothing is left out. No "thing," that is. Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be described in any encyclopedia, is absent." [LILA] Dan comments: Note the passage: "That's all there are." That would seem to negate your theory. [Krimel] Hey Dan! Let me begin by emphasizing that especially in ZMM Pirsig sets himself up as our tour guide through the high country of the mind. In that role I find him to be without peer. Durrant and Russell both offer more detailed tours of the history of philosophy. But at some level the trees begin to obscure the forest. Pirsig never loses sight of the destination and his instincts for the critical issues and landmarks along the way are exceptional. But that does not mean that he is always right. In fact quite often, I think he sees the importance of what he is pointing toward but does not appreciate its full implications. His talk about random access is a good example of him giving an excellent account of the phenomena but not fully grasping its meaning and significance. Chapter 11 which precedes the quote you offer is a glaring example of this. Pirsig is making arguments that were outdated when he made them. I believe that chapter seriously damages the overall significance of the MoQ. Ignoring Chapter 11 I see the MoQ as actually providing a metaphysical underpinning for current evolutionary thought. But I don't for a second think that Pirsig or his most devoted followers see it that way at all. So to that extent you are probably right and perhaps Pirsig does not agree with Craig on this point. I was merely leaving the door open to the possibility that Pirsig has not closed the door on the existence of the external world. Having said all this I don't think the passage you cite here closes that door. What you quoted is the second paragraph of Chapter 12. Here is the first paragraph: "Phaedrus had once called metaphysics 'the high country of the mind' - an analogy to the 'high country' of mountain climbing. It takes a lot of effort to get there and more effort when you arrive, but unless you can make the journey you are confined to one valley of thought all your life. This high country passage through the Metaphysics of Quality allowed entry to another valley of thought in which the facts of life get a much richer interpretation. The valley spreads out into a huge fertile plain of understanding." The "plain of understanding" in your quote is this "other valley of thought." I don't think that a journey into the high country of the mind ends with taking up residence in another valley. This would merely be trading and old rut for a new rut. And if that is what the Metaphysics of Quality really is intended to be, it doesn't really qualify as a metaphysics at all. It is then just the philosophy of static levels. Before his decent into that "huge fertile plain" Pirsig offers up a way to examine the fertility of fertile plains. Looking down from the high country we see a landscape of valleys and plain and we can journey through them in the same way we decide which pictures to linger before in an art gallery. The MoQ is a conceptualization of conceptualizing. Each of those valley and pictures at the exhibition are conceptual frameworks and your paragraph is about one of them. I have always thought of Lila as an MoQ test drive. And attempt to explore "a" conceptual framework using the "metaphysics" of quality. I don't see this an exploration of THE conceptual framework. Although I think many here and probably Pirsig himself do see it that way. So yes, "inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all there are." But "That's all there are," in this particular fertile plain. One could look at the totality of "everything" and carve into any number of different levels that would also be exhaustive. I think a more serious problem with this passage and what immediately follows is this "...Metaphysics of Quality allows an assertion about them that is unusual. It says they are not continuous." He insists that the levels are discrete. They are not. Concepts as James points out are discrete. But what they describe: perception, is continuous. It is unavoidable. We have to use discrete concepts to describe continuous processes. And so we develop words with specific shades of meaning to capture degrees along continuous spectra. To use a current example, faith, trust belief, conviction are discrete concepts conveying different degrees of the same underling perceptual experience. But concepts are fuzzy sets, discrete though they are misunderstanding often result from overlapping intersections of conceptual meanings. Our concepts are derived from and dependant on direct pure experience. I think the issue at hand is about whether or not perception is indeed all there is. I think that perception is derived from sensation and that sensation is the conversion of inorganic energy into bio-electro-chemical processes. It seems to me that those energies and relationships exist independently of my perception of them or my conception of them. Most of what I mentioned in the first post of this thread was examples of different understands or patterns of conception across historic times and space that seem to be aimed at the same underlying perceptual experiences of different people in different cultures. Their points of conversion suggest to me that those diverse conceptions are "about" something that none of those conceptual patterns fully capture. Dan: Right. When we talk about "laws of physics" what laws are we talking about? The laws that exist today are not the same as the laws that existed in the 1600s. The odds are that in a hundred years the laws of physics will scarce resemble the laws of physics as we understand them today. "Why does everybody believe in the law of gravity then?" "Mass hypnosis. In a very orthodox form known as `education."' "You mean the teacher is hypnotizing the kids into believing the law of gravity?" "Sure." "That's absurd." (ZMM) Is it? I don't think so... [Krimel] I agree that the concept gravity did not exist before Newton but the perceptions that give rise to the concept of gravity are independent of that conception. I would take the next step and claim that the relationships that give rise to perception are also independent of perception but I freely admit that this belief is of necessity a matter of faith Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
