dmb says: ...if SOM is a straw man a large number of famous philosophers have been mistaken for over a century and, because of your confusion, you have no idea what I "keep peddling".
[Krimel] Perhaps you could name a single philosopher who has used the phrase SOM or couched the argument in those terms. SOM, despite Ant's tepid treatment of the issue is a strawman precisely because of its selective treatment of this historic debate. The arguments advanced may be in the tradition of the mind/body debate but that is not what makes it a stawman. It becomes a strawman when it is simply used in an unsophisticated attempt to dismiss that which makes you uncomfortable. [dmb] As you must have noticed, the difference between Royce and James had quite a lot to do with Royce's proximity to Hegel, which was too close for James's comfort. [Krimel] Right, James was diametrically opposed to the kind of idealism you keep pushing. [dmb] The radical empiricists are rationalists. [Krimel] Is this a typo? I mean seriously.... Krimel said: By the way I was responding to your comment, "If a guy were interested in distinguishing traditional sensory empiricism from radical empiricism, he would read what James had to say about Hume." I quote what James says about Hume and you act surprised and then try claim his obviously bottom up view is somehow not reductionist. How are we to take this seriously, Dave? dmb says: James had a lot of things to say about Hume and the quote you offered up was a fragment. It lists examples of what he was saying but you forgot to include the part where he's actually saying it. [Krimel] So on the one hand I am long winded and on the other I am tossing out fragments. Dave a quote is by definition a fragment. Here is the whole paragraph an if you like I can e-mail digital version of just about anything James wrote. "Now, ordinary empiricism, in spite of the fact that conjunctive and disjunctive relations present themselves as being fully co-ordinate parts of experience, has always shown a tendency to do away with the connections of things, and to insist most on the disjunctions. Berkeley's nominalism, Hume's statement that whatever things we distinguish are as 'loose and separate' as if they had 'no manner of connection.' James Mill's denial that similars have anything 'really' in common, the resolution of the causal tie into habitual sequence, John Mill's account of both physical things and selves as composed of discontinuous possibilities, and the general pulverization of all Experience by association and the mind-dust theory, are examples of what I mean." [dmb] Like I tried to explain already, reductionism is when you explain complex things in terms of their simpler constituent parts, usually physical structures. [Krimel] As I have repeatedly said there are many forms of reductionism and you have not understood what I have said enough to say specifically what your objection is all you have done is make sweeping generalities. [dmb] Again, Hume's statement, Mills denial and account of things and selves, the pulverization of experience are all examples of what he means, but the quote has been chopped up so that we have to guess what these examples illustrate, the point that he means to demonstrate. His rejection of "Mill's account of both physical things and selves" sure looks like a rejection of SOM to me and, like I said, I suspect he's talking about the continuity of experience. That's pretty close to what you said about it, but it sure would be nice to have more than a sentence and a half. [Krimel] I believe the context of the quote was clear in the way I quoted it. He was not rejecting the other exemplars of empiricism only pointing out their inability to consider how we connect experiences together. Which does not require any kind of walk on the wide side. Krimel said: You are the one claiming James is Pirsig's sock puppet. I think it is clear that sensation was never off the table except in your head. Perception is the addition. I would even grant that James' expansion includes all of the "unconscious" and emotional processes that occupy us for about 90% of our lives, all of the automatic things, from the breathing, to driving a car. dmb says: And how could empiricism include the unconscious? By definition, the unconscious is not something we experience. I guess you mean dreams and other effects of the unconscious, which are actually known in experience. And I think you're also confusing James' idea of Pure Experience with the raw sense data traditional empiricism. [Krimel] A more modern understanding of the unconscious is exactly the kind of thing I have been aiming at but that is not as you say anywhere near being outside of the empirical. Perception involves the innate ordering of sense data. It carries with it the beginnings of the creating of meaning. dmb says: Oh, good god! Just the other day we saw Stanley Fish explaining how an anti-reductionism is built right into the structure of Pirsig's books and philosophy. Just the other day you saw Hilary Putnam and Sandra Rosenthal, who also share some major positions with James and Pirsig, denounce the reductionism of you some of your intellectual heros, some of today's top scientists. If you can ignore all that and still claim that Pirsig is a reductionist, you're just an incorrigible fanatic who won't listen to anyone. Jeez, have you been taking Platt lessons or what? [Krimel] Yes, yes, I dealt specifically with all of the quotes earlier. I do notice that you have failed each an every time to addess Pirsig's specific comment on the matter. Come on Dave saying I ignored that stuff is just factually incorrect. If you like I can dig up my comments. dmb says: Yea, your post are way too lengthy. I'm bored by it and can only imagine how boring it is for everybody else. [Krimel] My post was excessively lengthy because I was reiterating the many points you did and haven't addressed. [dmb] Yea, you know better than Pirsig, Putnam, Rosenthal and James but I'm delusional. Oh, that's richer than a triple-layered cheesecake. [Krimel] Odd how you cling to the allure of authority. I think you are seriously crippling the MoQ with your interpretation. I don't think you understand James at all. And if you think Putnam and Rosenthal are on your team, you have done nothing to show how. So yeah, you're delusional. 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