dmb, This post contained much more than "James says",. Nice post.
Marsha On Mar 19, 2010, at 12:07 AM, david buchanan wrote: > > > DMB said: > It is just a philosophological fact that the analytic tradition grows out of > this logical positivism and that's exactly where Matt's intellectual heroes > are coming from. > > Steve: > > Doesn't Pirsig come out of the same tradition? Pirsig was steeped in but > later rejected the "scientific" mindset and so did Rorty. Rorty got really > good at using analytic tools before figuring out that the whole game was > rigged and rejecting it along with the "scientific" mindset. Pirsig rejected > it based on eastern philosophy. Rorty rejected it based on American > pragmatism. That's the difference. > > dmb says: > > No, as a matter of fact I quoted chapter five, where he says "Logical > positivism's criteria for 'meaningfulness' were pure metaphysics, he > thought". That line ends a paragraph about the time he took a "course in > symbolic logic from a member of logical positivism's famed Vienna circle, > Herbert Feigl, and he remembered being fascinated by the possibility of a > logic that could extend mathematical precision to solve problems of > philosophy and other areas, BUT EVEN THEN the assertion that metaphysics is > meaningless SOUNDED FALSE TO HIM. As long as you're inside a logical coherent > universe of thought you can escape metaphysics. Logical positivism's criteria > for 'meaningfulness' were..." > > I think this shows that Pirsig's distaste for positivism goes all the way > back to his school days, but that isn't quite the point. I'm trying to > explain that Rorty and friends are offering a post-positivist critique of > positivism. I'm saying that Rorty and friends are attacking a certain kind of > empiricism. They assert the linguistic approach against traditional > empiricism in general and logical empiricism in particular. See, this is just > the beginning part of a larger argument about the differences between that > empiricism and radical empiricism. > > > Steve said: > ...Pirsig's importance is in confronting the fact that though positivism was > discreditted as bad philsophy, it continued and continues to be used in other > areas of inquiry. > > > dmb says: > > Well, his discussions of positivism serve two main purposes. They are one of > the two main opponents of metaphysics so he takes up their objections when > he's setting out on the task. The other purpose is to sharpen his empiricism > in a similar way. They are the kind of empiricist that he is not. 21 chapters > before we get to his identification with radical empiricism, he's already > distinguishing traditional empiricism from his own.... > "The MOQ subscribes to what is called empiricism. ... Most empiricists deny > the validity of any knowledge gained through imagination, authority, > tradition, or purely theoretical reasoning. They regard fields such as art, > morality, religion, and metaphysics as unverifiable. The MOQ varies from this > by saying the values of art and morality and even religious mysticism are > verifiable, and that in the past they have been excluded for metaphysical > reasons, not empirical reasons." > > > Steve said: > ...Once you've dropped all that "sense data" empiricism, why argue anymore > about what is more or less empirical? How can anything experienced be more > experiential than anything else that is experienced? How can the low quality > of sitting on a hot stove be any more empirical than the low quality of a bad > idea? > > dmb says: > > If you're asking about the Pirsig quote, the unloaded question is "how can > Quality be more empirical than subjects and objects?" That's what the DQ/sq > distinction is all about. Conceptual, verbal reality is secondary. That > doesn't mean that talking and thinking don't count as experience but this is > derived from a more fundamental empirical experience. Primary and secondary > experience are two kinds of experience or two elements in experience. This > primary experience is said to be MORE empirical because the secondary > concepts are always a small portion, a taking from or an extract of the > original experience as it is had and felt. > > Steve said: > The "just" reveals your distaste. Philosophy is a linguistic practice. It > isn't out of touch with reality. It can't take you closer to or further from > reality. It is already part of reality. > > dmb says: > > It's not my distaste. It is the main thrust of radical empiricism. Radical > empiricism says that the limits of "linguistic practice" have strangled > philosophy for far too long already. This is definitely what I'm trying to > get at. I'm trying to show you how this emphasis on language pushes against > the whole point and purpose of the MOQ, against it's central term and against > it's empiricism. As James puts it, "Philosophy must pass from words, that > reproduce but ancient elements, to life itself, that gives the integrally > new." He says, "There is no complete generalization, no total point of view, > no all-pervasive unity, but everywhere some residual resistance to > verbalization, formulation, discursification, some genius of reality that > escapes from the pressure of the logical finger.." James and Pirsig are both > saying that reality is much richer than words and concepts and that the > overflowing wildness that can't grasped by the logical fingers is not just > part of life, but the ce > ntral part of life. To the extent that our rationality and philosophies leave > this part our, we are impoverished. > > dmb says:Yesterday I tried to show how the assumptions of subject-object > metaphysics could be seen in Rorty's position, even as he was denying the > possibility of objective knowledge. "They [Fish's idea of pragmatists] > believe with Richard Rorty that 'things in space and time are the effects of > causes which do not include mental states' - the world, in short, is 'out > there' - > > Steve said: > That "the world is out there" bit doesn't sound like Rorty. I've only read > him to use "out there" to poke fun at Platonists. > > dmb says: > > According to Stanley Fish and the New York Times, that's a quote from Rorty > whether it sounds like him or not. Anyway, you've interrupted poor Stanley > Fish in the middle of a sentence. After "the world, in short, is 'out > there'", Fish goes on to say, "but they also believe that the knowledge we > have of the world is not give by it [the world], but by men and women who are > hazarding descriptions within the vocabularies and paradigms that are in > place and in force in their cultures. Those descriptions are judged to be > true or false, accurate and inaccurate, according to measures and procedures > that currently have epistemic authority, and not according to their fit with > the world as it exists independently of any description." "While there surely > is such a world, our only access to it, Rorty and Margolis say, is through > our own efforts to apprehend it. Margolis: 'The real world ... is not a > construction of mind or Mind ... but the paradigm of knowledge or science is > certainly c on > fined to the discursive power of the human.'" (Stanley Fish quoting Rorty and > Margolis and explaining their neopragmatic position.) > > Steve replied: > Do you oppose the common sense notion that you are in the world? I think we > can keep that notion without falling back into SOM so long as this notion > isn't used as metaphysics. If it is a tool for using reality rather than a > way of getting at what reality really is there is nothing wrong with saying > the above as a denial of idealism as well as scientific realism. > > dmb says: > I'm asking you to look at the assumptions at work in their reasoning. Fish > has framed the pragmatist position in terms of a real world out there and our > ability to access that world. He has done so three times here, once with a > Rorty quote, once with a Margolis quote and once in his own words. That is an > awful lot of SOM talk and I don't think you can just sweep it under the rug > because it doesn't sound like him. You think Fish would blunder a Rorty quote > in the New York Times? You know kind of shit storm would follow if he fudged > it or misconstrued? Sorry, but your denials aren't very plausible. > > Steve said: > You said, "Matt is saying that philosophy is confined to the things that can > be put under a description." Everything can be put under a description, can't > it? What is Matt leaving out of bounds for philosophy in saying this? If you > say DQ, you've just put DQ under a description. You've paradoxically > described it as something that cannot be described. > > dmb says: > Right, DQ is defined as undefinable because it can't be put under a > description. It's not a metaphysical chess piece. It's the immediate flux of > life. I'm making a case that DQ is the centerpiece of the MOQ despite that > fact. I'm also making a case that Pirsig thinks philosophies should make room > for all our experiences regardless of whether they are easily put into words > or not. And finally, I'm saying that the linguistic approach pushes back > against this effort to expand empiricism and broaden our philosophies to > include the nonverbal. > > I'd also say that "Quality" is just a vague reference and it isn't meant to > nail anything down. Just because we have a term for it, that doesn't mean > it's UNDER our descriptions. Like I was saying, the preconceptual is primary > and is more empirical than any descriptions that follow. That's why it can be > referred to, described in terms of what it is not, and otherwise include it > in our descriptions of experience. That's part of why I said the neopragmatic > emphasis on discourse and vocabularies is very simpatico with the way Plato's > dialectics put pressure on the Sophists to define their undefined Good. > > Steve replied: > We can have reality in all sorts of ways, but we can only describe it with > words. (Unless you have another way?) > > dmb says: > > You're conflating form and content. Yes, obviously descriptions require words > and concepts. That's the form. But the content of the MOQ, the central term > of the MOQ, refers to preverbal, preconceptual experience. And radical > empiricism says that all experience must be accounted for in our > philosophies. Again, as James says, "Philosophy must pass from words ... to > life itself". > > dmb had said: > The MOQ wants the true to be subservient to the good, not the other way > around. In terms of the MOQ, that means DQ is the primary empirical reality > and static intellectual quality is a species of the good that follows from > and is subservient to DQ. > > Steve replied: > This subservience notion doesn't sound pragmatic to me. I'm not sure it is > all that Pirsigian either. DQ and SQ are two sides of the same coin. Quality > is an empty jug. Its inside and outside define one another. Neither needs to > bow down to the other in "subservience." > > dmb says: > > This talk about "subservience" is a reference to Plato's battle with the > Sophists. "in order to win the battle for Truth in which ARETE is > subordinate, against his enemies who would teach ARETE in which truth is > subordinate. Plato must first..." And it comes from the hierarchy of the MOQ, > where he says "DQ is a higher moral order than static scientific truth, and > it is as immoral for philosophers of science to try to suppress DQ as it is > for church authorities to suppress scientific method". Further, I'd say > radical empiricism and all that is the attempt to recover what was lost back > in ancient Greece when Plato defeated the Sophists. "And now he began to see > for the first time the unbelievable magnitude of what man, when he gained > power to understand and rule the world in terms of dialectic truths, had > lost. ...He had exchanged an empire of understanding of equal magnitude: an > understanding of what it is to be a part of the world, and not an enemy of > it." > > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > Hotmail: Trusted email with powerful SPAM protection. > http://clk.atdmt.com/GBL/go/210850553/direct/01/ > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
