Ham,
On Mar 21, 2010, at 1:28 PM, Ham Priday wrote:
> Happy Spring to you, Marsha --
>
>
>> Maybe I should stick to 'unpatterned experience', experience
>> without overlaying memory/concepts/patterns.
>>
>> How is experience different than value-sensibility?
>
> You seem to have a semantic problem with cognition which muddles your
> epistemology and makes your understanding of experience something that it is
> not.
I love this sentence. I won't deny it.
>
> I don't see why our common understanding of "experience" must be adjusted or
> redefined to satisfy a philosopher's thesis. The dictionary defines
> experience as: "The conscious perception of an external, bodily, or psychic
> event." It says nothing about "patterns", nor does it qualify experience as
> "direct" or "indirect". In a more general definition, however, it does state
> that experience is "something personally encountered, undergone, or lived
> through," indicating that experience is a "process" that is proprietary to
> the individual, rather than an independent realm or level accessed or
> "attached to" by the observer.
The dictionary should be my final authority??? I don't think you mean that.
Patterns of preference, patterns of experience, patterns of value, I think RMP
has chosen the most perfect word.
>
> Also, there is no difference between experience and "the experienced". John's
> suggestion that "experience may be telling you something" is romantically
> enticing but epistemically wrong. We bring value into the world as being,
> and the objective reality we construct reflects our value preferences.
> Through experience we each make our "being-in-the-world" a representation of
> our individual value-complement.
Huh? - You're not so bad at creating semantic problems yourself.
>
> For me, experience is an extension of value-sensibility whereby apprehension
> is oriented to the space/time dimensions of the intellectualized
> ("conventional"?) universe.
You say that experience is an extension of value-sensibility, but you have not
explained how you define value-sensibility. What is it?
> Thus, "immediate experience" -- e.g., pain, pleasure, fear, change,
> tacticity, sensory perception -- is converted (reified?) into discrete
> objects and events, sometimes called "universals". This is the work of
> intellection in conjunction with memory (your "overlaying
> concepts/patterns"). So that what "begins" as value sensibility ends up as
> what we call experiential or empirical knowledge.
Isn't what you're calling a universal, a pattern? Please define
value-sensiblity.
> Knowledge conforms to the universal order of our relational existence because
> it is derived from the same fundamental Sensibility/Otherness that is primary
> to every conscious subject ("experiencer").
Please define/describe a subject? Is that a mind. Is that a body? Is it a
mind and body? What else? Please, what exactly is a subject?
> Only the individual preferences, qualitative feelings, psycho-emotional
> responses, and valuistic meanings are unique to the observing subject.
Let's start by establishing what is this 'subject'?
> Have I helped to clarify the issue, Marsha, or only further complicated your
> understanding?
Oh sure, just like the Linda Blair character in the move, 'The Exorcist'.
Marsha
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>
>> Marsha
>>
>>> The MoQ confusion stems from the fact that Pirsig is a "monist", not an
>>> absolutist. And, although he did not name or posit an "absolute source",
>>> his equivalency paradigm "Experience = Quality = Reality" leaves the
>>> inference that one or more of these equivalents is "absolute", whereas in
>>> fact all three relate to the finite, existential world.
>>>
>>> Essentially speaking,
>>> Ham
>
>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 9:49 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> > Hello John,
>>>>> >
>>>>> > How would you break this down to address: the experiencer,
>>>>> > the experience and the experienced?
>>>>> > because undoubtedly they are descriptions of the same thing,
>>>>> > the event, the experience, no?
>>>>>
>>>>> They are not the same in the conventional use of English.
>>>>> _I am seeing a tree. _'I' is the seer. The experience is seeing.
>>>>> The tree is the seen. Experience has become a trinity.
>>>>> What I have been saying is that only the seeing is a fact in
>>>>> that moment. The seer, 'I' , and the seen, 'tree' are surmised
>>>>> from the experience of seeing. They are built from patterns, no?
>>>>
>>>> I agree the tree, the I, and this act of seeing are built from patterns,
>>>> yes.
>>>>
>>>> But I cannot 'see' how handing the crown of significance to any
>>>> one part of the trinity of experience is better in any way.
>>>> All three legs of the tripod depend upon the others to avoid toppling.
>>>>
>>>> "The seeing" is not a fact if it's a hallucination
>>>>
>>>> The seer is not a fact if there is no seeing.
>>>>
>>>> The seen is not a fact if either the seer or the seeing disappears
>>>> from view,
>>>>
>>>> Therefore, they are the three, interdependent in order for
>>>> experience to occur.
>>>>
>>>>> There are grammatical rules, dictionaries and social training
>>>>> for interpreting the words we use, no?
>>>>>
>>>>> yes! Which influences the conceptual frameworks of meaning
>>>>> we build.
>>>>
>>>> I agree completely.
>>>>
>>>>> > but to address the experience of the hot stove, it depends.
>>>>> > It can be good, or it can be bad. When a child learns to listen
>>>>> > carefully to its mother's warnings, that is an overall good.
>>>>> > If the child is so badly injured that she dies, it's an overall bad.
>>>>>
>>>>> Judgements based on individual static pattern histories and dynamic
>>>>> context. I've always wondered if RMP would say there is a difference
>>>>> between the value/experience and the judgements made subsequent
>>>>> to the experience. I would think there is a big difference, no?
>>>>
>>>> But as Ham points out, without the judgement there can be no valuation of
>>>> the event. However he takes then the judger as absolute whereas I see it
>>>> as
>>>> none of the three legs of the tripod can be absolute - you need a subject,
>>>> an object and a valuation all at once or there is no experience.
>>>>
>>>>> > Thus the value or Quality of the event is not in the immediate,
>>>>> > experience, but in the overall context - an interpretation between > the
>>>>> > subject and object AND some third overarching principle of valuation.
>>>>> > Interpretation is triadic in nature and thus more inherently stable > >
>>>>> > than
>>>>> > the diadic relationship of S/O.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > As you know,
>>>>>
>>>>> I know Absolutely nothing, how about you?
>>>>>
>>>>> Marsha
>>>>
>>>> I thought there were no absolutes. :-)
>>>>
>>>> John
>
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
> Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
> http://moq.org/md/archives.html
___
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html
