The Coherence Theory of Truth:  Truth is what coheres with what else we hold 
true. 
It is true that all truths cohere with each other, but this is just a necessary 
condition, 
not a sufficient one for truth. 
The Pragmatic Theory of Truth:  Truth is “the name of whatever proves itself to 
be 
good in the way of belief.” 
But there are many ways a belief may be good &  being true is but one of them. 
So being a good belief is not sufficient to distinguish truth. 
Pirsig argues against:  The Correspondence Theory of Truth: 
1) Truth is what corresponds to the facts. 
2) If truth is what corresponds to the facts, there is only one set of facts. 
3) There is not only one set of facts. 

4) :. Truth is not what corresponds to the facts. 
But this argument only defeats one version of the Correspondence Theory of 
Truth, not: 
i) Truth is what corresponds to a set of facts. 
ii) There can be more than one set of facts. 
iii) :.  Truth is not what corresponds to  only one set of facts. 
Pirsig furthermore claims that truth is "provisional". 
What's an example: 

At one time we date the fossil of a human as one that died in 6 - 7 million BC. 

Later we refine our procedure & date it as having died in 4 - 5 million BC. 
It can't be that it was ever true that the human died in 6 - 7 million BC & 
now be true that it died in 4 -5 million BC.  The only way that could be 
true is if the human died in 6 - 7 million BC, came back to life & died again 
in 4 -5 million BC. 
To avoid this absurd conclusion, we should say not that truth is provisonal, 
but that the body of our held beliefs or justifiable beliefs are 
provisonal/revisable. 
Craig    

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