Good post Mary! Very good post!!!
On Jun 5, 2010, at 1:30 PM, Mary wrote: > Hi Steve, > > Some comments inline. > > On Behalf Of Steven Peterson >> Sent: Saturday, June 05, 2010 10:08 AM >> To: [email protected] >> Subject: Re: [MD] Language >> >> Hi DMB, >> >> No response on this so I an reposting... >> >> >>> Steve said: >>> I was talking about the issue of language as something that ought to >> be transcended--whether a pragmatist ought to agree or disagree with >> the mystic who says that the fundamental nature of reality is out side >> of language. ... Perhaps you could try reading it again and tell me >> where I get all SOM on you. I don't see how since I was criticizing the >> Pirsigian notion of getting outside language as being an SOM idea about >> language intervening between a subject and an object as he did in his >> lens metaphor: "The culture in which we live hands us a set of >> intellectual glasses to interpret experience with, and the concept of >> the primacy of subjects and objects is built right into these glasses. >> If someone sees things through a somewhat different set of glasses or, >> God help him, takes his glasses off, the natural tendency of those who >> still have their glasses on is to regard his statements as somewhat >> weird, if not actually crazy." >>> >>> I think he is using an SOM metaphor to attack SOM. What the heck >> could it mean to take the glasses off? Now he sees the world as it >> actually is instead of with SOM blinders? ...You are right that Rorty >> doesn't see any value in the notion of getting outside language. Nor do >> I, but I do recognize that Pirsig clearly does. I agree with Rorty, >> pace Pirsig, that the notion is incoherent once we drop the subject- >> object picture. While Pirsig sees the mystic as saying that the >> fundamental nature of reality is outside of language, Rorty is saying >> that that notion is incoherent unless you imagine reality in one hand, >> you on the other, and language as what James sarcastically called a >> tertium quid intermediate between the two. ... >>> >>> >>> dmb says: >> >>> First of all, please notice that the SOM glasses interpret >> experience, not the world as it actually is. The idea of the world as >> it actually exists IS the idea of an objective world and that is what's >> built right into the glasses. It is the interpretation, not reality >> before it's interpreted. >> >> Steve: >> It is a fair correction to my attack on the glasses metaphor when you >> say that what Pirsig is doing is not the same as the standard SOM lens >> metaphor, but I still think the SOM glasses bit (and probably every >> occular metaphor for knowledge) is just as problematic. You describe >> what's going on as reality before it is interpreted on the one hand >> and the interpretation on the other with the SOM lens as the tertium >> quid intermediate between the two. I think it amounts to pretty much >> the same thing as a lens intervening between a subject and an object. >> We still have (1) a description and (2) what is being described as >> well as some third thing standing in the way of making good >> descriptions. >> >> The following is better since it at least drops the third thing: >> >> Dynamic Quality is defined constantly by everyone. Consciousness can >> be described is a process of defining Dynamic Quality. But once the >> definitions emerge >> they are static patterns and no longer apply to Dynamic Quality. So one >> can say >> correctly that Dynamic Quality is both infinitely definable and >> undefinable because >> definition never exhausts it. (RMP from LC) >> >> Steve: >> I think it is good that you hint at talking about experience as >> interpretation and Pirsig in the above also does well to talk about >> experience as a process of interpretation (or definition or >> description). But when we are asked what it is that is being described >> we should hear the sound of one hand clapping. > [Mary Replies] > No. Not one hand clapping. Once you are aware to ask the question the DQ > has already turned into SQ. Once it's SQ, the way you answer the question > depends on how you wield the analytical knife, and that will be SOM. > > The glasses are not an intermediary third thing. > 1) There's some DQ but you don't know it because you're not aware of it yet. > 2) You become aware of it, and it instantly turns to SQ because you are > aware of it. It's NOT DQ anymore. > 3) You categorize it with your SOM glasses, giving it a name and such. > > Any answer would not be >> the answer. The next best thing to not answerring at all would be to >> just offer up some concept of conceptual emptiness (DQ) which Pirsig >> would admit is just one more interpretation and the advice to unask >> the question at best. Pirsig noted that from a mystic's perspective it >> is a bad question--that it would be best to keep quiet--and then he >> gives an answer anyway. By identifying his philosophy with mysticism, >> he is stuck in this paradox. So why identify with mysticism? The >> mystic reality is no better than the objective one as far as the >> problem that the positing of a reality that is beyond description is >> to offer a description of it as being beyond description. And at the >> same time, it is not beyond description because it is the only thing >> that is ever described. So Pirsig says that "one can say correctly >> that Dynamic Quality is both infinitely definable and undefinable." At >> that point in one's understanding of the MOQ, isn't it better to say >> nothing at all about DQ? >> >> >> DMB: >> As you've construed it, we take off those SOM glasses and find >> ourselves looking at.... (wait for it, wait for it --- dramatic pause) >> ...the exact same thing we saw before we took off the glasses. I think >> it's pretty clear that this would be absurd. The whole point of taking >> off those glasses is to see things differently, of course, and that's >> where the next point comes in. >> >> Steve: >> My view isn't that we take the glasses off and see exactly the same >> thing. My views is that there ought not be three separate terms here. >> Taking off the glasses ought to be an incoherent notion in Pirsig's >> metaphor if here is no Cartesian subject to be wearing the glasses. >> The subject is a collection of patterns of preferences and the glasses >> then are part of that collection of patterns. A person doesn't take >> them off and SEE something new. The person IS something new. >> >> And this person taking off the glasses who has just rid herself of a >> particular collection of patterns of preferences is not now free from >> all patterns of preference. The person IS patterns of preferences. One >> pattern of preferences gets replaced by another hopefully better one. >> Removing all patterns of preferences (taking off all of our glasses) >> would be to unpeal an onion to the point where there is no human being >> left. >> > [Mary Replies] > 1) No. You are still there. Everybody else can still see you, but you > would be considered as "somewhat > weird, if not actually crazy." > 2) Just because you peel off all your glasses doesn't mean you disappear to > yourself either. There's a difference between being able to "experience" DQ > and "being" DQ. >> >> DMB: >>> The trick to understanding the MOQ is in understanding what it >> actually means to claim that the fundamental reality is outside >> language. >> >> Steve: >> Why do you always take me to be not understanding when I am >> disagreeing? I do understand the MOQ and I know Pirsig's philosophy >> includes the notion that the fundamental reality is outside reality. > [Mary Replies] > No! "the fundamental reality is *outside reality*"???? > 1) There is no "fundamental reality" there is only DQ and SQ > 2) We have a strong preference for SQ > I >> am saying that Pirsig was wrong--that he would have done better to not >> associate enlightenment with the notion of transcendence of language. >> >> DMB: >> The first thing to do is tell yourself that this fundamental reality >> is NOT the objective reality, is NOT the world as it actually >> is....The fundamental reality he's talking about is DQ or pure >> experience. This is NOT a claim to have direct access to the world as >> it actually is because, again, that just an idea that's derived from >> experience, a conceptual interpretation of experience. The primary >> empirical reality is just experience itself, not experience OF >> things-in-themselves. >> > [Mary Replies] > Correct. There is no "world as it actually is" >> Steve: >> Yep, I understand all that to be what Pirsig is saying. Now, how >> exactly is it possible to be unenlightened in the sense of being out >> of touch with reality if reality is experience itself? What in this >> simple experience=reality picture needs to be transcended? >> > [Mary Replies] > SOM is what can be transcended. The notion that everything is subjects and > objects. That you are different from your surroundings. That you, the > subject, Steve, is different from all the not-you objects. That subjects > and objects are not the fundamental reality of the world, but that SQ can > instead be viewed as patterns of value. Remember, DQ you will never 'see' > because by the time you are aware of DQ it has become SQ. > >> Since we can never be out of touch with reality, then our only >> philosphical problem is a need for better descriptions. All >> transcendence in terms of language can mean is to bring some new good >> description into the world, and all that enlightenment can mean is the >> state of having really good interpretations that can easily be dropped >> when better ones become available. >> > [Mary Replies] > No. Now you're just moving the puzzle pieces around on the table. But > that's probably ok because as Pirsig says, it's all good. The only thing we > can really know is that SQ CAN be seen as patterns of value rather than as > objects. You see, if you stick with the SOM glasses all your life, you are > - by default - the center of your own private universe. There's nothing > else you could possibly be. If you quit presupposing a "you the subject" > observing "not-you the object", then a whole new range of possibilities > opens up. Very liberating. SOM is isolating. The MoQ's SPOVs are NOT > isolating. >> >> >> DMB: >> In the MOQ, there are no things-in-themselves because, again, that is >> just one of the ideas built into the SOM glasses. Instead, the cutting >> edge of experience is not so much "outside" language as it is "prior" >> to the conceptualizations that quickly and habitually interpret it. In >> this immediate flux of life there are as yet no differentiations. The >> whole situation has a qualitative feel or an aesthetic charge, as in >> the hot stove example. By the time you realize the situation in terms >> of stoves and injured butts, you're looking at the situation through >> conceptualizations. These two kinds of experience, conceptual and >> pre-conceptual, work in tandem all day long whether we realize it or >> not. >> > [Mary Replies] > Yeah, but that explanation doesn't get at the heart of the matter. You have > yet to lose yourself. You are still explaining everything in terms of you > the subject experiencing something not-you the object. > >> Steve: >> So instead of outside/inside you are now preferring a distinction >> between the past and the present. And the SOM glasses are part of the >> present. Everything happens in the present--even refection on the >> past. You say that "In this immediate flux of life there are as yet no >> differentiations." Well then when do differentiations occur if not in >> some later Now? Nothing ever happens that doesn't happen in the >> immediate flux of life. >> > [Mary Replies] > And DMB, see how you've sidetracked Steve here? Now he's off onto worrying > about time, when time is just another SPOV like everything else. Do you see > what a bad question that is "when do differentiations occur"? >> >> DMB: >> ...The case of Jill Bolte Taylor makes a similar point from the >> opposite direction. She was a brain scientist who has a stroke and >> lost the use of her rational, verbal hemisphere and could only >> experience reality as a whole, so much so >>> that she could not tell where she ended and the universe began. She >> now says that what she experienced was Nirvana and she cries tears of >> joy when she tells the story. We can think about this pure experience >> or undifferentiated experience in terms of the lack of distinction >> between subject and object but it is a lack of all distinctions. To >> fully realize this lack of division is to be enlightened. That's the >> fundamental reality that Pirsig is talking about. That's what the >> primary empirical reality is. Traditional empiricist and especially >> positivists would never touch this, not even with a ten-foot pole. >> >> Steve: >> I don't know what to make of these "tears of joy." You've sketched >> enlightenment as a form of brain damage here. You talk of fully >> realizing the lack of all distinctions as though that's how things >> REALLY are and all dictinctions are illusion--that this primary >> reality is what is really real. You know James studies this kind of >> stuff in detail (if you've read Varieties) and never jumped to these >> sorts of metaphysical conclusions. >> > [Mary Replies] > Well, Steve, this 'tears of joy' stuff is exactly what Pirsig is talking > about. Nevermind James, he's no authority. Pirsig came to his realizations > after experiencing enough mental anguish and torment to get himself > involuntarily institutionalized. You must remember that. We are not > talking about an academic-theoretical philosophy here. The difference > between what James is capable of talking about and Pirsig is miles apart. > >> >> >> >>> Steve said: >>> ... Trying to compare language to something else that is outside of >> language is in this analogy an attempt to step out of your own skin. >> Why would anyone who has already dropped the correspondence notion even >> think of trying to do that? >>> >>> >>> dmb says: >>> The primary empirical reality is undifferentiated awareness, it's the >> reality you experience before you have a chance to think about it. >> >> >> Steve: >> You've just excluded thinking from emprical reality. >> > [Mary Replies] > Exactly. > >> DMB: >> ...Anyway, I don't know who is trying to compare language to what's >> outside language but the mystics and Pirsig will tell you that it >> can't be done. >> >> Steve: >> >> Pirsig says it can't be done because language is not adequate to >> representing reality. That is an SOM notion that ought to be >> discarded. Language doesn't fail to represent reality when language >> doesn't represent at all--when all we have are static patterns of >> value and dynamic change. >> >> We have interpretations (static patterns) and the ability to create >> new and better descriptions (DQ). We can say what we ought to say >> about language using such notions of static and dynamic quality >> without positing some mystical realm or state that language keeps us >> from accessing. >> > [Mary Replies] > No we can't. > > Best, > Mary > >> Best, >> Steve > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
