[Matt]
What you are pointing out about our debates is that interpretive
issues are (sometimes) taken to be the only ground on which
philosophical debate can
happen: my version of THE MoQ has become THEE MoQ. THEE best
philosophy to hold is an admirable goal, but not when you can only
talk about THE MoQ (if you catch my drift). So you suggest talking
about "a MoQ" to get to thee best philosophy.
[Arlo]
Well I avoid "the" and "thee" in any sense other than convention, and
instead think its better to talk about "betterness". This has been my
entire point to Bo all along, and the SOLites, but all they continue
to hear is "stifling free speech" or other such nonsense. This is
because, I am convinced, they are trapped by the "THE". Their entire
edifice is a grab for sole legitimacy, not a declaration of
betterness. And as such are bogged down by demanding that everyone
else (including Pirsig) is "wrong" about THE MOQ, rather than saying
"A MOQ that says... is better than A MOQ that says..."
[Matt]
Switching to isms, however, presents something a little different
rhetorically, I think. I could say "THEE pragmatism says...," but it
would be redundant from saying, "Pragmatism says..." because implicit
in the assertion is your command of the core of just what "pragmatism says."
[Arlo]
Interesting. So if we had an umbrella "ism" that could refer to a
general structure of agreement (maybe even only DQ/SQ, IBSI levels)
then we could use that to build the common ground, but then
differentiate on specific disagreements. Something like "Qualityism
says there are four static levels. Bo's Qualityism holds the
intellectual level to SOM, while Pirsig's Qualityism considers SOM to
be one of many intellectual patterns."
Am I understanding you correctly? Not sure I like "Qualityism"
though, maybe "Valueism"?
[Matt]
The interpretation of what the core of any ism is is just as
contentious, if not fundamentally interminable, as interpretation of
a particular person.
[Arlo]
Sure. But I think contention over defining "common ground" is
different from contention over whose ground is the One True Ground.
This is moving the dialogue to better ground, as opposed to ending it
or watching it flail about in the mud.
[Matt]
Mr. Buchanan and I's discussions _were_ fundamentally about
pragmatism sans authorial modifier.
[Arlo]
I can't really comment on your discussions with DMB, mostly because I
haven't fully dissected them for the nuances you mention, and even
more so because I have much unfamiliarity with the authors you
mention. As such, I can't really say one way or the other, except to
say you are both passionate about advancing Pirsig's ideas and as
such I admire you both.
[Arlo previously]
If someone kept writing "Robert Pirsig says... Robert Pirsig says...
Robert Pirsig says...", we'd see that for what it is. But the same
person writing "the MOQ says... the MOQ says... the MOQ says..." this
is kinda placed behind a veil.
[Matt]
That makes sense. I think I'm willing to say that, while optimism or
pessimism about conversation _actually_ getting better is still in
play, this particular recommendation would expose the issue more
clearly and at least make _this_ area of difficulty less
likely. Good show. Now we just need to get everyone to adopt it
without thinking that they're conceding an important philosophical issue.
[Arlo]
I, personally, have begun trying to purge use of the narrative "the
MOQ" from my posts. I think for many the hard part will be the
habituated convention of using this to MEAN "Pirsig says...". I look
back and in a few recent posts its popped up in my writing, always
though synonomous with "Pirsig says...". And the funny thing is its
not a philosophical issue at all. As I said to Mary, who actually
think "the MOQ" speaks? Of course it does not. Its a narrative device.
So when I say something like "the MOQ reserves the social level
exclusively for humans, but I think it's better to formulate the
social level to allow non-human biological patterns", I mean "Pirsig
reserves the social level exclusively for humans, but I think it's
better to formulate the social level to allow non-human biological patterns."
Or even, "Pirsig's MOQ reserves the social level exclusively for
humans, but Arlo's MOQ formulates the social level to allow
non-human biological patterns".
Or best, "Arlo believes that A metaphysics of Quality where the
social level is open to non-human biological patterns is better than
A metaphysics of Quality that reserves the social level exclusively
for humans".
All these say the same thing, but you can see as they progress that
the latter ones are articulated much better.
[Matt]
That's good stuff. I absolutely agree about branding as
community-forging. And your example of Ham (properly constituted for
use in this example only) moving to, say, a general philosophy forum
and passing for a Pirsigian because he is close enough though the
"Pirsigian community" rejects him (one could apply this example to
Rorty's relationship to Dewey) is excellent.
[Arlo]
Thanks.
[Matt]
My only difference, I think, may be that I think that while we _can_
(and should) distinguish between social-community-commitments and
intellectual-content-values, we can only do so _from within_ an
already constituted community.
[Arlo]
I agree with this.
[Matt]
This means that there is no "social realm" distinct from an
"intellectual realm" where one could have a pure value apart from the
other. This is my criticism of the social/intellectual distinction
(one I haven't talked about in a long while, I think now because I've
been a long time coming to this newer understanding of what I was
trying to say).
[Arlo]
Hmm. I am going to have to think about this a bit. My first reaction
is to say "of course", as Pirsig wrote "our intellectual description
of nature is always culturally defined". But I think you mean
something more than this foundational wellspring uniting these two
"realms", no?
I agree with Bakhtin that knowledge is dialogic, that "intellect"
evolves by virtue of its dialogic construction. And once here, it is
hard deconstruct dialogue into specifically "social" and specifically
"intellectual" fragments. Indeed, the very words of the dialogue are
social building-blocks that constrain and enable the dialogue.
So I think, yes, I agree that you can never have a purely
intellectual realm apart from a social realm, this would be like
suggesting a purely biological realm that exists apart from the
inorganic realm. Just as inorganic components form the foundational
basis for cells and bodies, social patterns form the foundational
basis for ideas and knowledge.
[Matt]
To the first, I think it punches up how we are committed to _more
than one_ community at all times, fluctuating memberships that are
instituted by our continually changing conversation partners. I
think it is perfectly reasonable to expect the same metonym
("Pirsigian" or "Deweyan") to be used in slightly different ways
depending on the discourse-community involved.
[Arlo]
Emphatically agree. Discourse communities never stand in isolation,
there is always a plurality of involvement. And I'd further say that
the use of metonyms in one community impacts our use of that in
others. I, in another forum, may be less inclined to consider Ham a
"Pirsigian" there even though others there might, because of my
experiences here.
[Matt]
To the second, I think I can still see the value in your comment
about "battling for a label," and how this truly does happen and
signify lack of intellectual interest, but that it does not require
us to see two distinct realms, but rather requires the two "realms"
to be entwined in the way I've specified: to feel this signal, one
must count up the number of intellectual commitments shared between
two people arguing about it _and_ set a bar for what the required
ones are to get one in the door of a particular community.
[Arlo]
Agree. I'd add only that I see these labels as being conferred, not
necessarily demanded. I "accept" you as a Pirsigan, for example,
based on your participation and knowledge I experience here. Its not
so much you coming to me and saying "I am a Pirsigian". In this way,
the title is more or less the "diploma" for gaining acceptance into a
discourse community, and often it is unspoken, evidenced only by the
way the community accepts your participation. This is not to imply
its a passive process, though, as gaining acceptance (by virtue of
participation) is something actively sought (or at times actively resisted).
You sound very familiar with Lave's and Wenger's theories on LPP,
Duality, and Communities of Practice. Interesting stuff there.
[Matt]
You and I, Arlo, don't often discuss each other explicitly, but it's
always seemed as if we hold a lot in common on a number of
fronts. What do you think about the above?
[Arlo]
I too think we are largely in agreement. As with John, Ron and few
others, the only disagreements I see many times are very minute or
nuanced ones, certainly not much in the larger areas.
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