Ho Ham,
> > Of course knowing anything "for certain" is a dangerous precipice to stand > on. But knowing that one holds (possesses) a thought -- that the thought is > his own -- is critical to epistemological understanding, whether it's > idealism or objectivism. Regrettably, Pirsig has never made this clear to > me. John: It seems to me to be so fundamental to what we do, and what he was writing, that it doesn't need to be made explicit. Nobody stands on a soap box and trumpets that the sun has risen today. We all know that the sun has risen today. If the matter were held in some doubt, I could see making an argument that one's thoughts are one's own. Ham: There's so much talk about thoughts and ideas being "social patterns", and > intellect belonging to a level one must "attach to", that I lose confidence > in Pirsig's epistemology. I'm skeptical of a philosophy that does not > acknowledge the proprietary nature of conscious awarness. John: Well I admire a philosophy that allows for the idea of conscious awareness as property, while also leaving room for other interpretations of being also. Hindu Philosophy, for instance, does not make the same distinction between consciousness and contents of consciousness - thou art that sort of thing. Do you believe that there is only one proper interpretation of being? One way of looking at things that is the "true" way, and all others are faulty? Because I'm skeptical of a philosophy which does not contain a way of evolving and self-correcting. Ham: > Without Value and a free agent there can be no choice. A universe evolving > to goodness or perfection for its own sake is morally meaningless and does > not allow for freedom. John: With your first statement, I agree absolutely. With your second, I disagree absolutely. I believe the analogy of the organism is apropos for the cosmos. "For it's own sake" implies also, for the sake of it's parts as well. I believe Freedom arises with individuality. Or you could say, freedom defines individuality and the individual is free to oppose the universal evolutionary betterness, or to fail to realize it out of some existential fear, but as an individual, I intuit my own freedom and deduce from the facts of existence, a universally evolving good. I don't see any moves you could make to argue me out of such a belief, given the ultimate unprovability of the stance, one way or the other, but at the same time, holding the belief gives me room to breathe and reason to strive - the two most necessary components of animal existence. Otherwise, how could I face my task of being? You'd have to demonstrate some real pragmatic reason for looking at it differently. Ham: > Individuals are not free if their choices are predetermined by Nature, > God, or Quality. John: I agree. And if an individual is not free, Neither Nature, God or Quality even matter. I take my individual freedom as necessarily given. Ham: > My concern is that the Pirsigians have so convoluted human consciousness > that anything resembling original thought or personal preference has been > rejected as SOMist dogma. Arlo came close to describing this state of > affairs with you and Platt in the A.I. thread. You had suggested that "the > idea is an act of creation, through an individual intellectually responding > to some social pattern or some socially accepted or presented ideas." > > [Arlo]: > >> Yes, the idea is an act of "creation", not by something apart from us, >> but BY us responding to Quality. >> >> The troubling word here is "from". Ideas do not come "from" anywhere >> in some sense that they existed elsewhere and are then delivered to us. >> Ideas come from the response to Quality, the moment of pure experience. >> >> What we have to keep in mind is that "creation" does not occur BY >> something else, it occurs IN RESPONSE to Quality. "Creation" is what >> WE do . . . >> > > To Platt he responded: > >> If DQ "creates", then we are mere automatons. No, WE create. >> WE create IN RESPONSE to Dynamic Quality. It is the soil which >> makes the flower possible. >> > > I hate to agree with Arlo, but he's right on this issue. Not only do WE > create ideas and concepts, we actualize the objects and events that give > "being" to our value-sensibility. Where he errs is in accusing you and Platt > of "Qualigod manipulation" which is the ontological thrust of Pirsig's > Quality thesis. > John: I agree with what Arlo said, and with you on the place where he errs. He errs in construing certain religious beliefs which are widespread and poorly conceived, on any theistic formulation, no matter how carefully constructed metaphysically. But that's a common error shared by many in the world and within this discuss community. I'd advise all who err on this point to consider this formulation in their meditation practice (coined by Pirsig himself): God is a high Quality intellectual pattern. Ham: > > Berkeley's principle "To be is to perceive" is the ontogeny of > Essentialism. We perceive (more precisely, "sense") Value and experience it > differentially as Being. The physical universe is thus an experiential > system as much as it is valuistic. And it is the cognitive individual, not > culture or society, who creates existential reality. > > John: Is not experience a value? Is not perception a value? So I can certainly chime in with your "universe is as much experiential as valuistic". I question your distinction of the cognitive individual and the culture. Cognitive individuals are the creations of a culture, just as culture is simultaneously the creation of individuals. As Pirsig points out, the famous Cartesian dictum should have said "The 17th century French culture exists, therefore I realize I am." This is obviously true for the psychological as well as ontological levels of analysis. Ham: You will have to explain what "A Pirsigian Quality" is, and what it means to > be "born in one-ness", before I can offer an intelligent comment. In my > terms, as I've indicated above, existence is born of value-sensibility and > converted by experience into discrete objects and events. Simultaneity is > not at issue. > > John: Well I guess what troubles me in your formulation, is that "value-sensibility" arises only in a subject perceiving an object and realization of this duality from a higher perspective of both-born-at-once. So while you say, "simlutaneity" is not at issue, you construct a sequence which implies otherwise. I'd be uncomfortable stipulating such a sequence, when all I'm really sure about is that you need all three - value, subject and object - simultaneously for experience. And I still don't see any useful distinction between existence and experience. They both mean the same thing in essence, do they not? Ham: > Morality is a human invention designed to facilitate a social order. I'm > suspicious of doctrines that call for a "proper attitude", as I don't see it > as commensurate with value realization. John: By proper attitude, I mean positively oriented. Pro-life as opposed to anti-life. If your values aren't pro-life, then they're not any good and should be overthrown. Since anti-life values in a society will eventually wreak havoc upon the living beings that make up a society, I can't see any society that holds such attitudes as very long-lasting. Ham: Undoubtedly Muhammad, Hitler, and Mao-Tse-Tung all identified their values > with a "higher purpose", destroying many lives in the process. John: And likewise the manifest destiny holding this country in it's grip in the mid-19th century when it was conquering from sea to shining sea. But I'd say the most anti-life views of any of those three leaders you postulate was Hitler's, and the Thousand year Reich dissappeared the fastest, making my point somewhat. Ham: > The basis for societal value lies not in attitude, ideology or dogma but in > love and respect for the sanctity of one's fellow human being. John: Yes, exactly. That was what I mean by "attitude". Love and respect for the sanctity of all life is the best attitude I can postulate. Ham: But individual values must be tempered by reason -- that other uniquely > human attribute without the exercise of which a harmonious society is > impossible. > > John: I like the definition of reason I get from Ed Abbey where he says Reason is "wisdom tempered by love". Ham: > > Royce's phrases would appear to be more profound than his philosophy. John: I think you'd have to read his philosophy for yourself, to make that judgement adequately. As opposed to taking my beginner's word for what he says. According to philsopholigists I've read, Royce's best and most complete philosophy was wrapped up neatly in his The Problem of Christianity, which is available in google books. I'm enjoying it so far, but haven't read too deeply into it yet. Ham: What is immortal -- the "identification", the "self", or the "purpose? And > how are we to know or define the "higher purpose"? > > John: The Purpose, is the point. And discovering and defining it is our life-long task. > > Ham: > >> There's no need to "utilize" Nothingness or Being, since neither is >> absolute in itself. >> > > I'm afraid you have misquoted me. The word was "ultimize", not "utilize". > I coined it in reference to your complaint: "if you posit some sort of > ULTIMATE nothingness surrounding or contextualising ULTIMATE being, as > ontologically necessary... I don't think I can go there with you." > > John: Sorry about that! I thought it was a typo. And it makes more sense now, to see that I was "ultimizing" Ham Thanks for the link to Peters' exposition which I shall read and report back > to you on. Since you've provided this before the Schain essay appears on my > Values Page, I'll give you a head start. The direct link from which I > copied it is http://rschain1.tripod.com/The_Problem_of_Existence.html . > > Happy reading, Greetings, again Ham, 4 days later. I thought I'd sent this reply, but then realized I hadn't. I'd waited to read Schain's essay so I could comment.... and got distracted, and here we are now. I must say, I wasn't impressed. I agreed with every word he wrote, but that doesn't interest me much. I thought about it a bit more and realized I would also not have been impressed, if I disagreed with him. So I wonder if I'm just particularly hard to please or something. I don't like reading what I disagree with and I don't like reading what I agree with! You just can't please some people, I guess. I do think his words were good and should be heeded by all people. At least, what I could remember of them. It sorta reminds me of a reported interview with Pirsig where he mentioned ZAMM was panned in Japan because "we already know this. It's all obvious. Yawn." While over here it's "way too out there" to be acceptable to academia. Hilarious. I hope you had the inclination to read all the way through the Peters article. And btw, when I followed your link to your posting of article on your website, it looked kinda screwed up. Hopefully it's all fixed. But even though I subjected you to more pages than you gave me, I hope you read that. I'm very interested to get somebody's take on Borges and Cantor and the solutions of transfinite numbers to recursion in set theory. And how this all ties in with Magical Realism and literarture and TS Eliot... I feel the glimmer of a beckoning idea in there. Take care Ham, sorry for the long delay, John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
