Steve and y'all:

I sympathize with Sam's concerns about relativism. It seems to me that 
classical pragmatic theory of truth would just about meet his demands for 
realism, but without resorting to the correspondence theory. In that view, we 
don't need to get outside all human practices in a godlike fashion or compare a 
description with a piece of un-described reality. The classical pragmatic 
theory of truth is empirically based in the sense that our ideas agree with 
experience. Truths are judged in terms of their practical results, their 
consequences and effects. I think this test of truth supplies a level of 
realism that would be much more palatable to anyone concerned with relativism, 
including Sam Harris. 

It would be nice if you unpacked your paragraph about the hypothetical mystic. 
I think there is something interesting in there but I don't quite follow the 
argument. I mean, the idea of using mysticism to save the correspondence theory 
is a pretty jarring idea. Pirisg says does the opposite of that and the 
mystical experience itself would be conceived as non-conceptual so that we 
could call it unmediated experience but not unmediated knowledge. This would be 
related to Quality or pure experience more than the pragmatic theory of truth, 
however, and it's not the sort of thing that can be used as evidence for 
propositional sentences. Anyway, here's the unpackworthy paragraph:



Steve said:
Harris thinks he can save the correspondence theory of truth and thereby save 
realism if he can show that there may be knowledge unmediated by language. “If 
certain mystics,” he offers for instance, “were right to think that they had 
enjoyed unmediated knowledge of transcendental truths—then pragmatism would be 
just plain wrong *realistically*.” The problem for the pragmatist in Harris’s 
view is that even if the hypothetical mystic did not actually enjoy unmediated 
knowledge, that fact would still be fatal for anti-realism, because if the 
pragmatist claims that unmediated knowledge is not possible, he is making “a 
covert, *realistic* claim about the limits of human knowledge. Pragmatism 
amounts to a realistic denial of the possibility of realism.”





                                          
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