hi , Ham. (Adrie) Only on first sight it seems to be so that what you wrote is anti-pragmatic. It is not pragmatic, have to agree with Mr Buchanan for that notion,but if i study it in depth it shows to be more non-pragmatic than anti pragmatic.
Now , pragmatism opens a superb toolbox to allow us to handle philosphy or science, and surely it has become the mainstream in these fields, WJ and Pirsig were wright about that,along with 85 % of science and the philosphical corner, the metaphysikal branch of our thinking. Reading some things closely from your production, and compared with what David meant to say,..i'll think i can see the underlying problem. Allow me some remarks on a little snip of the content. Quote , Ham. As far as human beings are concerned, Truth and Reality are relative (not abstract) notions. They relate to --and indeed define -- the principles that work in a differentiated space/time system. There is your "pragmatism", David. Its knowledge is drawn from the well of scientific investigation, and its methods are directed toward problem-solving and the development of utilitarian tools. This is not the goal of metaphysics, which serves to satisfy man's quest for an understanding of reality beyond its experiential manifestations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is lesser in conflict with the pragmatic approach than it looks on first sight. Your first sentence is running a flat tire... " Truth and Reality are relative (not abstract) notions." Allow me to rephrase it so it will fit a pragmatic modelling. "Truth and reality are conditional notions,depending on the observer and the observed.(conditional position observer,conditional position of the observed) We do not have to define the observer as only 'HUMAN' or the observed as only relative, ..because the notion/position RELATIVE is to be derived from the conditional setting we use to 'observe' A stone that is smashed into the soil by a falling tree, is therefore an observer. The tides of the ocean, up and down,high tide, low tide are there because the ocean is an observer of moon's gravityfield interfering with the earth's mass. The ocean is an observer. It contains a big question,nl, what is the importance in pragmatism of these conditional truths derived from changing conditions?It kept on bugging me for a long time, what is the value of conditional thruths, conditional observers and observations. The answer was to be found in the LILA'S CHILD annotations(Thx for recording them Dan!) How do they interact with us,are they important to keep in our toolbox,do they carry a pragmatic signature........of course they do. ( LC ) annotations. Annotations by Robert M. Pirsig ------------------------------- (30.)" I think the answer is that inorganic objects experience events but do not react to them biologically, socially, or intellectually. They react to these experiences inorganically, according to the laws of physics." ------------------------------------------------ Comment Adrie according to the laws of physiks,....yes, most definetely, all of it the laws , the conditions of the physikal world,the conditional appearance of the observer, a rock , an ocean,..(inorganic observer is implied and declared valid) ....."they expirience events", this is in complete harmony with quantum physiks and Pragmatism and the moq-model.This declaration is of the utmost importance. it opens the door for conditional truths, and relative notions derived from these.So the conditional truts will rank higher in the hierargy of patterns of value. ---------- So, its a bit far-side pramatism to see it this way, Ham, but you are in a lesser conflict with the moq model than your self-declared one,and you are not deviating far from pragmatism. If you like you can find lots of good stuff on far-side pragmatism on Stanford.edu Been thinking about your conflict with Hawking's model of top-down cosmology.. try to see it like this,...we all live beneath the starry skies..., is all what it says. Adrie 2011/2/20 Ham Priday <[email protected]> > > Hi David -- > > > On Sat, 2/19/2011 at 4:56PM, David Buchanan <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > I think Ham's position is profoundly anti-pragmatic. It is the kind of >> Platonism >> or "vicious intellectualism" against which James and Pirsig are >> diametrically >> opposed. As they see it, common sense is a vast collection of concepts >> invented by our ancestors and handed down to us as we learn the language >> and become a part of the culture. Common sense is made up of those static >> patterns that work so unproblematically that they larger go unexamined. >> But when common sense concepts are taken up by more abstract intellectual >> pursuits like science and philosophy all sorts of problems seem to emerge. >> >> Chief among these problems is reification, the error of treating an >> abstract >> concept as if it were an actual entity. Plato's forms are the classic >> example >> and that's why they call it Platonism. For Plato, you'll remember, the >> beautiful >> things and good things in this dirty old world aren't really real. What's >> real is >> >> Beauty and Goodness itself but most humans live their lives down in a dark >> cave, >> believing mere shadows are the real world. If that sounds a bit too lofty >> and >> otherworldly, that's only because it's too lofty and otherworldly. It's a >> world-hating, life-negating, logic-confounding mistake. >> > > As I scanned your post to decide whether to respond, it appeared to be an > indictment of my position. The classic pejoratives -- "anti-pragmatic", > "vicious intellectualism", "otherworldly", "deifying the intellect" -- all > seemed to castigate my essentialist stance. > > Later, however, on careful reading, I found myself largely in agreement > with what you said. Essentialism is not a praxis for life, although I would > categorize it as "A-pragmatic" rather than anti-pragmatic. Though hardly > "vicious", it is a kind of "idealism" which, like Platonism, does not suit > James' or Pirsig's existential approach. And while I may be guilty of > "reifying an abstract concept", I do not posit Goodness and Beauty as the > realities of this world, but as the values from which our appearance of this > world is constructed. Lastly, Essentialism is founded on the concept of > Essence, which I cannot deny is "otherworldly" in nature. > > > And James and Pirsig also say that subject-object metaphysics makes >> exactly the same mistake. It takes practical, common sense concepts out >> of their context and then treats these abstractions as if they were the >> very >> structure of reality, as if they were the real stuff behind our >> experience. >> > > If Essentialism were truly a subject-object metaphysics, it would be based > on common-sense notions of reality, mistaking subjects and objects for "the > real stuff behind our experience." But it isn't and it doesn't. The "real > stuff" of experience is sensible value, and the reality Essentialism > addresses is a primary source called Essence. > > > Instead of confusing ourselves with abstract notions of Truth and Reality, >> let's remember that concepts are only be called true to the extent that >> they >> can be used in our experience right here on earth. Ideas, they insist, are >> human inventions and they're supposed to serve human needs. Why should >> reality be something only a hand full of geniuses can understand? What >> good >> is philosophy if it doesn't help actual people in their actual lives? >> > > As far as human beings are concerned, Truth and Reality are relative (not > abstract) notions. They relate to --and indeed define -- the principles > that work in a differentiated space/time system. There is your > "pragmatism", David. Its knowledge is drawn from the well of scientific > investigation, and its methods are directed toward problem-solving and the > development of utilitarian tools. This is not the goal of metaphysics, > which serves to satisfy man's quest for an understanding of reality beyond > its experiential manifestations. > > What good is philosophy if it doesn't help actual people in their actual > lives? Let's not forget that spiritual fulfillment is a human need, too. > Why should reality be something only a handful of geniuses can understand? I > would submit that it is not "understanding" but "the willingness to accept a > new concept" that your shadow-world cave-dweller lacks. Apart from this, > there are aspects of metaphysical truth which are not in the best interest > of even "geniuses" to know. For one thing, absolute knowledge is > inconsistent with relational freedom, one of man's most cherished values. > > As health is a biological good and wealth is a social good, truth is a >> species >> of the good. It is a high quality concept, not the answer to the riddle of >> the >> universe. That sort of quest only makes sense if you believe that the >> intellect >> has divine powers but James and Pirsig are looking at these issues with >> the >> assumption that the human powers of intellect are a product of evolution. >> As the James scholar Charlene Seigfried points out, intellectualism had >> become vicious already with Plato and Socrates because they deified the >> intellect and denigrated the flux of life from which our concepts >> originate. >> > > Health and wealth have value to the individual because they make the > life-experience more pleasurable, relative to illness and poverty. But it > does not follow that "truth is a species of the good." Truth is a > proposition expressing the actual state of reality, good, bad, or in > between. Also, although human intellectual capacity is an evolutionary > development, its most significant "power" is the cognizance of the knower. > > I still don't see why the Jamesians insist that intellectualism is > "vicious" or why it "denigrates the flux of life." All told, however, I > think your analysis has done me a favor, David. It has afforded me another > opportunity to expound my philosophy in a way that clarifies the differences > I have with both scientific objectivism and the Quality paradigm. > > Thanks for the attention and best wishes, > Ham > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > -- parser Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
