Tuukka said "Wittgenstein asserted famously that what can be said, can be said clearly, and what cannot be said, must be passed over in silence. It might even be groundbreaking to show that concepts, whose extension is unclear, can be used in a constructive manner, as it seems to refute this Wittgenstein's idea."
True, but he said that in Tractatus, and refuted it later himself in Philosophical Investigations. Russell never did get the joke. Still makes me chuckle. Ian On Wed, Mar 23, 2011 at 10:55 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko <[email protected]> wrote: > Greetings, Ham, and thanks. > > But I didn't speak of intentions. I used the word "intension", which is a > different thing. Wikipedia says something about it. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intension > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extension_%28semantics%29 > > Intension and extension are rather clearly defined concepts known at least > since the times of Bertrand Russell, so I did not invent them, and the > relation between them is very well recognized. > > It is my understanding that in Buddhism it's ok to use concepts whose > intension or extension is somewhat unclear. I believe the Diamond Sutra uses > "reality" or an analogous concept in a manner that is not semantically > clear, but is instead used as goodwilling trickery to make the reader > understand something that is difficult or impossible to understand by using > semantically precise language. > > I am very interested in finding an explanation on how this trickery works. > It seems to me that it is assumed and expected to work, but it is not > explained why it works. Providing an explanation is maybe not possible, but > that would only lead to the question: why exactly is it not possible? > > I am not sure where MoQ stands on this. Dynamic Quality seems like a concept > whose intension is clear, but whose extension cannot be determined. I'm > interested in getting an expert opinion on this. If someone ever wants to > build a bridge betweed western analytic philosophy and eastern philosophy or > MoQ, questions like this must be addressed. Basically, Buddhism and MoQ seem > to occasionally, and in a very serious manner, use language in a way that is > unheard of in the western tradition. > > I don't know the state of very modern philosophy, but Wittgenstein asserted > famously that what can be said, can be said clearly, and what cannot be > said, must be passed over in silence. It might even be groundbreaking to > show that concepts, whose extension is unclear, can be used in a > constructive manner, as it seems to refute this Wittgenstein's idea. > > -Tuukka > > > > > 22.3.2011 6:11, Ham Priday kirjoitti: >> >> Greetings, Tuukka -- >> >> Welcome to the forum. >> >> On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 4:04 PM, "Tuukka Virtaperko" >> <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Ham: >>> >>> You seem to be missing a point that's related to intensions and >>> extensions. Let's take the concept of squares as an example. The intension >>> of this object is the definition of squares, ie. >>> "all numbers that equal an integer multiplied by itself". The >>> extension of this object is "1,4,9,16,25..." >>> >>> You seem to be attempting to use the concept of "reality" as a >>> reference to the extension of "reality". What is the intension of >>> this concept? >>> >>> Perhaps more poetically put: If reality is not a term at all, how can you >>> use it as a term? >> >> I have no "hidden agenda". Reality is a valid term, but as I have often >> pointed out it, it is defined differently by empiricists and philosophers, >> respectively. Accordingly, I make a distinction between "existential >> reality" and "ultimate reality". The former defines the plualistic universe >> and its finite components as experienced, the latter is the uncreated source >> or ground of all that is. >> >> However, I don't get your point because I don't see a relation between >> "intention" and "extension". Although the phrase "by extension" suggests >> that a given concept can apply to more than one event or process, you didn't >> use that phrase. Instead you tried to relate two words that don't even >> share a common prefix. My point to Mark was that intent always implies an >> "intender" or subjective agent with a goal or purpose. Thus, when you say >> "the intention of this object", what you really mean is: it is YOUR >> intention to use this object as an example that relates the two words. >> >> Your example doesn't work for me. But if, indeed, I am "missing >> something" here, I'm sure that Mark or somebody else will hasten to explain >> what it is. >> >> Nice to meet you, Tuukka, and thanks for your interest, >> Ham >> >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >> > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
