Dmb,
So while you chastise others for deviating from a standard english dictionary definition, even for example when I cited resources addressing an expanded Buddhist definition of reification, you offer in your discourse on free will what you (dmb) says that Charlene says that James says that might find a point of agreement with what RMP says? Marsha > > Dmb, > > Does James's definition of free will conform to the the standard dictionary > definition? If it does, why did we need all these quotes to explain it? > > > Marsha > > > > > On Jun 27, 2011, at 6:29 PM, david buchanan wrote: > >> >> Charlene wrote: >> "...The pragmatic method includes directives for validating a belief, >> whereas the principle of pure experience includes directives for formulating >> the belief in experiential terms...He [James] calls on the principle of pure >> experience, for instance, to demonstrate that if activity is to have any >> meaning at all, it must be derived from 'some concrete kind of experience >> that can be definitely pointed out' (James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, >> 81). The first step in the investigation must be to seek 'the original type >> and model of what it means' in the stream of experience." (Charlene >> Seigfried in "William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy", page >> 318.) >> dmb comments: >> Seigfried is explaining James and quoting James. And she is telling us that >> concrete experience - as opposed to abstract thought - is the only place to >> look for the meaning of our activity. To find out what words like freedom >> and causality mean, the first thing to do is return to the stream of >> experience to see what they are in the originally felt and lived experience. >> That is where our concepts and abstractions come from and that's where they >> are tried and tested. That's what our ideas are about; life as it's lived. >> >> >> Charlene wrote: >> "James then develops his concrete description of human activity; 'But in >> this actual world or ours, as it is given, a part at least of activity comes >> with definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal; it comes >> complicated with resistances which it overcomes or succumbs to, and with the >> efforts which the feeling of resistance so often provokes; and it is in >> complex experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents, and of >> passivity as opposed to activity arise. Here also the notion of causal >> activity comes to birth. (ERE, 81-2) James culls from experience original >> models for understanding not only action, but causality and freedom. >> ...He goes into detail about the 'ultimate Qualiia' of 'these experiences of >> process, obstruction,, striving, strain, or release' and concludes that we >> cannot conceive of it as lived through except 'in the dramatic shape of >> something sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles, and overcoming >> or being overcome'." ( Cha >> rlene Seigfried in "William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy", >> page 319.) >> >> dmb says: >> Here Seigfried makes good use of James's literary talents. The man really >> knew how to choose the right words to express a kind of phenomenology of >> causality and freedom. In other words, he's carefully describing what it's >> like to feel the push and pull of the immediate flux of life, the perceptual >> flow, or as Pirsig calls it, direct everyday experience and the primary >> empirical reality. Notice what James says right off the top? "This actual >> world of ours comes with a definite sense of direction; it comes with desire >> and sense of goal," he says. Doesn't that sound a lot like the dim >> apprehension that leads us on, as Whitehead is quoted in Lila? I think so. >> But more specifically, James is saying the idea of causal forces comes from >> the lived and felt resistances offered by concrete experience. He's saying >> that the idea of freedom comes from the concrete experience of overcoming >> this through effort and striving. On this view, the laws of cause and effect >> are abstractions that gr >> ow out of the simple concrete fact that some events consistently follow >> other events. Time is a fancy idea for the simple fact that one event >> follows another without any such causal connection. Subjects and objects are >> also abstracted from experience in this way. And so it is with all our >> conceptual categories. We add them to experience for our own benefit. But, >> as Emerson said, Man should not be subdued by his instruments. >> >> Charlene wrote: >> "...We want to know whether we are responsible for our activities or are >> determined by events outside of our knowledge and control. The phenomenal >> level cannot be superseded if we are even to ask the right questions or >> frame the experiments correctly. The issue is precisely whether events which >> we experience as ours are in fact so, or whether they should be reductively >> attributed to brain cells. In returning to the metaphysical question >> James defends the position that the nature, meaning and location of >> causality can be determined only at the phenomenal level of concrete >> experience (Essays in Radical Empiricism, 91). It it thus not a metaphysical >> question at all, but a concrete one, or one answerable within the parameters >> of radical empiricism. Not only does he show that the metaphysical question >> must be dropped as unanswerable on its own terms, but taking activity at its >> face-value, or as we experience it, we also discover 'the very power that >> makes facts come and be' . I >> n arguing that facts are interactively constituted by us, he has finally >> explicitly drawn the consequences of his break with the empiricist >> assumption that our percepts passively mirror reality as it is in itself." >> (Charlene Seigfried in "William James's Radical Reconstruction of >> Philosophy", page 322.) >> >> dmb says: >> At this point it becomes very clear that she is talking about free will and >> determinism. That's what we want to know about our activities; whether we >> are responsible or determined. The metaphysical question must be dropped, >> she quotes James saying, for the meaning of causality can only be found by >> returning to actual, concrete experience. Causal relations are not built >> into the fabric of the cosmos such that our conception corresponds to that >> objective fact. Instead, The laws of cause and effect are answerable to the >> original concrete experiences from which they were derived in the first >> place. >> >> >> Charlene wrote: >> "To the objection that our felt activity is only an impression and the facts >> are to be found elsewhere he responds with the principle of the radically >> empiricist philosophy according to which anything, to be considered real, >> must be located within experience. If creative activities are to be found >> anywhere, 'they must be immediately lived' (ERE, 92). ...What we mean by >> causing, even if we mislocate it, are activities of 'sustaining, >> persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on, and finally >> achieving our intentions'. For anything to be called a cause, it must be of >> the sort of activity that resembles this 'creation in its first intention,' >> this 'causality at work.' To call this phenomenal experience of activity a >> mere illusion is to prefer a hidden ontological principle, that can never >> experienced and thus never verified, to an experientially verifiable level >> of investigation. James, therefore, concludes that 'real effectual causation >> as an ultimate nature , a >> s a 'category', if you like, of reality is JUST WHAT WE FEEL IT TO BE, just >> that kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal." >> >> "...Therefore, the nature of causality is not to be found in searching for >> such a transcendental cause of causes, if this means a non-experiential >> source of what is experienced or some 'more' real, 'unimaginable ontological >> principle' mysteriously hidden from our investigations. Furthermore, the >> worth or interest of our investigations of activity does not even consist in >> discerning the elements of conjunctions of things empirically but 'in the >> dramatic outcome of the whole process' (ERE, 94). The only reason for >> investigating activity and causality is to help us understand the course and >> meaning of life. The pragmatic stance is that we seek to know, not for its >> own sake, but to enable us to live better." (Seigfried in "James's Radical >> Reconstruction", page 323. Emphasis is James's in the original.) >> >> dmb says: >> To say that the feeling of free will is an illusion, she says, is to prefer >> unknowable ontological principles over actual, verifiable experiences. This >> is what James calls "vicious abstractionism", wherein the products of >> reflection are taken to be more real than the empirical flux of reality from >> which they were abstracted in the first place. Or, as Pirsig phrases this >> complaint, this is the subordination of Quality to intellect. Pirsig and >> James both push back against this other-worldly Platonism, insisting that >> the point and purpose of our ideas is to serve life, not to unlock the >> secret riddle of the universe. And that's why we want to know about >> responsibility and determinism, because of the practical effects it has in >> human life. It's a human question, not a metaphysical mystery. >> Interestingly, Charlene was only using this issue to shed light on the >> relationship between James's pragmatism and his radical empiricism. That's >> what I was looking into when I found this analysis of the free will >> business. But she goes on to apply these ideas to the issue of SOM and to >> the existence of physical objects as such. In both cases James appeals to >> pure experience to keep us from reifying these concepts. And it is >> applicable to any concept you'd care to name. As concepts, they have been >> tried and tested and they've worked well enough to get passed on generation >> after generation. As metaphysical or ontological categories, however, they >> become the source of endless confusion. >> >> Charlene wrote: >> "It has been the traditional interpretive distinction between a world of >> subjective experience and the world of objective reality that has generated >> contemporary attacks on objectivity and verifiability. Such REIFIED >> distinctions can be dissolved by drawing out the implications of the >> perspective that 'The world is surely the TOTAL world, including our mental >> reaction." (Seigfried, 356.) >> >> >> "James appeals to pure experience to keep us from REIFYING these categories: >> 'We may, indeed, speculatively imagine a state of pure experience before the >> hypothesis of permanent objects behind its flux has been framed; and we can >> play with the idea that some primeval genius might have struck into a >> different hypothesis' (James, Meaning of Truth, 43). Imagining a state >> of pure experience reminds us that the way the world appears to us, the >> self-evidenct objectivity of objects, is actually the result of inventive >> categories by our ancestors that have been found to be useful and therefore >> preserved and passed on to us through our culture and language. However, we >> cannot remake the world at our will. As a result of past choices, some >> possibilities cannot be realized anymore..." (Seigfried, 358.) >> >> >> dmb says: >> I also wanted to post these quotes because the first one describes >> subject-object metaphysics as a reified distinction and the second one says >> that the objectivity of objects is also a concept - one that has become >> reified. She also adds a cautionary note: these concepts can be demoted from >> their metaphysical rank and recognized as the human constructs that they are >> BUT that does NOT mean we can remake these concepts at will. If you want to >> communicate with your fellow human beings, the commonly inherited language >> and its thought categories are indispensable. Or, as Pirsig puts it, >> definitions are the foundation of reason. The names Cain and Abel may have >> been decidedly arbitrarily but now that they've been established, James >> says, we must not confuse the two lest we cut ourselves off from the culture >> and the language. Or, as Pirsig puts it, if you think you can go outside the >> mythos, then you don't understand what the mythos is. To go outside the >> mythos is go insane. That mi >> ght be somebody's idea of fun but it doesn't work very well in a >> philosophical discussion group. Or in rush-hour traffic. >> >> > > > > ___ > > ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
