Hi There is one step before the choice which is the estimation of the Value of the alternatives to choose between. The choice is usually made of the most prefereable alternative, the one with the highest grade of betterness. This pre-experience is based upon our individual set of preferences that are probably quite different from any other. Thus, free will is also a question of if we can have an original identity and an original set of experience and preferences. To the extent you know your own preferences and have taste for being normal, your choice is of static quality. To the extent where you don't know exactly what you're doing or just don't care, like Lila, you may be dynamic or just lucky.
I prefer to be different and responsible for my taste. Jan-Anders 13 sep 2011 kl. 21.06 Andre Broersen wrote: > Steve: > Nice job digging up those quotes and tying them together. > > dmb: > Thanks, Andre. Nice work, as usual. Yes, me too. > > Andre: > Thank you Steve and dmb for your kind words in response to my last post. > I had hoped however that it would clarify some issues and perhaps (one > could only hope) that it would 'settle' the seemingly months long debate > between you two but...it seems not. Excuse my own intellectual > shortcomings but I am confused. > > At some stage in the debate, very early on, I had thrown in the idea > that Lila is after something: > "Biologically she's fine, socially she's pretty far down the scale, > intellectually [as an intellectual] she is nowhere. But > Dynamically...Ah! That's the one to watch. There is something > ferociously Dynamic going on with her. All that aggression, that tough > talk, those strange bewildered eyes." > > The way I interpret this (and correct me if I'm wrong) is that Lila, > from the biological point of view struggles to follow Dynamic Quality. > She knows she's 'over the hill'. She wants some sort of social > recognition/security. In this way she is acting morally, what I would > term responsibly. > > Place this in the context of the evolutionary value continuum, the > struggle between preference and probability (Lila's stay with Phaedrus > but eventual return to Rigel)"As such, it's apparent that this 'value' > continuum (of freedom) stretches between largely determined sub-atomic > particles to complete artistic freedom. This is important > (metaphysically) as this continuum facilitates, in a largely > deterministic physical world, a notion of moral responsibility and a > considerable intellectual freedom for an individual regarding aesthetic > decisions."( Anthony's PhD, P 137). > > So what is a morally responsible action then? > > Given Pirsig's moral framework as the static levels being the > fundamental grounding of moral organization, moral action (i.e. to act > morally responsible) is simply 'one where a higher level takes > precedence over the lower one (e.g. where the social takes precedence > over the inorganic [ or in Lila's case where her social patterns take > over from her biological/organic patterns] while an immoral action is > one where a lower evolutionary level of reality takes precedence over a > higher one (e.g. where the biological level takes precedence over the > intellectual)." (ibid pp 93-4) > > Lila's patterns act morally because she wants to 'become part of' a > higher level of quality, the social level. But why did she blow it, in > Pirsig's way of thinking, given the surname he's given her? > > I think this is so because the MOQ posits that the evolutionary process > is a process where all static patterns of value are moving towards > Dynamic Quality. "Lila, individually, herself, is in an evolutionary > battle against the static patterns of her own life"(LILA, p 367) > > Can we still speak of determinism or free will here? > > Of course I argue No. Preferences and probabilities. Will Lila go all > the way towards DQ? No. That is why she blew it. "She wasn't ready to > emerge from her static patterns. She was still locked into them"( AHP > tape 4). And from within that level her patterns would be socially > 'determined' or rather 'dominated'. > > Was Lila's action somehow 'caused'. Are preferences 'caused'? Could she > have acted differently? Yes and no. Thing is that from Lila's point of > view this was probably the best (!) she could manage. Is her social path > therefore 'determined? Yes and no. That depends on what happens. The > answer to this is left open, but we can guess...as Phaedrus does. > > Lila was free to the extent that she followed DQ. She attemps to > 'migrate' from the biologically 'determined' level to higher up: the > socially 'determined' level. > > My confusion comes in when the debate still involves 'causation' and > 'determinism' because somehow Lila 'could have acted differently'. > > Let me use a different example which may sound silly but I hope it gets > my confusion across. The would be sage following DQ. He is after > 'enlightenment. She is after DQ. Could s/he have acted differently? The > sage would say, to make my pursuit successful I HAVE TO weaken/reject my > links with the biological, social and intellectual static levels. I MUST > reject them because I WANT to follow DQ. > > Is the life of the would be sage, the person who seeks DQ/ Enlightenment > predetermined by expressing this preference? Are these values caught in > spiral of causation/determinism? I somehow get the feeling that this is > still playing in the debate. > > Am I wrong or is my confusion unfounded? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
