Dmb,
Although RMP has stated Static Quality "refers to anything that can be conceptualized," I don't think static quality is based on concepts alone. Appearances are built on patterns of perception as much as concepts. It boggles the mind, but one picks out a tree, or automobile, as much from recognizing a visual pattern. Marsha On Oct 11, 2011, at 4:02 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > dmb says: > Please notice what they are saying about "reality" with the glasses off. The > pre-intellectual reality is what James calls feeling, sensation, a collective > name for all these sensible natures, just what appears. It makes sense that > Suzuki would this pre-conceptual experience 'no-mind'. Now compare this > sensory flux as reality with the basic problem of appearance and reality. An > encyclopedia article begins by saying "the chief question raised by the > distinction is epistemological: How can people know the nature of reality > when all that people have immediate access to are appearances?" > > > The MOQ does not fall into this trap because, as you just saw, the reality > described by Pirisg, James and Buddhism is the appearances to which we have > immediate access. From this point of view, there is no "reality" more real > than "just what appears". The encyclopedia says "responses to the question > fall into one of three classes: Those that argue that observers are > unavoidably "cut off" from reality, those that argue that there is some way > of "getting at" reality through the appearances, and those that reject the > distinction." The MOQ takes the latter view; it rejects the distinction. The > MOQ makes a different distinction, a distinction between concepts and > empirical reality not between appearance and reality. > > > Think of it this way. The traditional distinction between appearance and > reality is a distinction between empirical or phenomenal reality and that > world of experience is contrasted with some kind of trans-experiential > reality, a reality beyond what we can experience. For Plato this would be the > world of Forms, for Kant this would be the world of things-in-themselves, for > scientific materialism this would be "objective" reality. But the radical > empiricist does not allow any such extra-empirical realities. Reality is > limited to that which can be known in experience so that, in effect, > appearance IS reality. > > > That is why we can NOT rightly take the MOQ to be making any claims about > that one true account of The-Way-Things-Really-Are. The appearance-reality > distinction presupposes an objective Way-Things-Really-Are to which > subjective philosophical systems should try to conform. But the MOQ's central > distinction does NOT make that pre-supposition. In fact, Pirsig and James > both explicitly attack and reject SOM as their starting point and their > distinction between concepts and reality is built on the lot where SOM used > to stand before they knocked it down. > > ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
