Steve said to Ham:
It [Anti-realism] isn't meant as a pejorative term for idealism so much as a
broader term for positions that deny the existence of an objective reality.
Pragmatists and MOQers don't affirm the existence of objective reality. ...
pragmatists are neither realists in affirming the existence of objective
reality nor anti-realists in denying the existence of objective reality. We are
anti-anti-realists. ...we don't hold the existence of objective reality as a
metaphysical certainty .. And we don't take objective reality as a _basis_ for
developing a system... ...Our descriptions of reality are always descriptions
made for a purpose. ..We have no practice-transcending descriptions to offer.
We aren't denying that reality is objectively real. We just can't make any
sense of the notion ...
dmb says:
The term "anti-realism" was coined recently by Michael Dummett, an analytic
philosopher who was dealing with issues in analytic philosophy. Putnam and
Rorty famously debated realism and anti-realism but, if Hildebrand is right,
they were rehashing issues that James and Dewey had already dispatched. This is
the same book wherein Hildebrand says that Rorty "eviscerates" pragmatism.
What's my point?
You're pretending to speak for pragmatism but what you're saying is just
analytic philosophy with some strains of pragmatism in it.
I know, there are Jamesian-sounding thoughts and slogans mixed into what you
say, but it's oddly stripped of James's pragmatism.
Here's a little bit of Wiki on ANTIREALISM;
In analytic philosophy, the term anti-realism is used to describe any position
involving either the denial of an objective reality of entities of a certain
type or the denial that verification-transcendent statements about a type of
entity are either true or false. This latter construal is sometimes expressed
by saying "there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not P." Thus, we may
speak of anti-realism with respect to other minds, the past, the future,
universals, mathematical entities (such as natural numbers), moral categories,
the material world, or even thought. The two construals are clearly distinct
and often confused. For example, an "anti-realist" who denies that other minds
exist (i. e., a solipsist) is quite different from an "anti-realist" who claims
that there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not there are unobservable
other minds (i. e., a logical behaviorist).The term was coined by Michael
Dummett, who introduced it in his paper Realism to re-exa
mine a number of classical philosophical disputes involving such doctrines as
nominalism, conceptual realism, idealism and phenomenalism. The novelty of
Dummett's approach consisted in seeing these disputes as analogous to the
dispute between intuitionism and Platonism in the philosophy of
mathematics.According to intuitionists (anti-realists with respect to
mathematical objects), the truth of a mathematical statement consists in our
ability to prove it. According to platonists (realists), the truth of a
statement consists in its correspondence to objective reality.
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